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JURY TRIALS IN HYBRID AND NON-HYBRID
ACTIONS: THE EQUITABLE CLEAN-UP DOCTRINE IN
THE GUISE OF INSEPARABILITY AND OTHER
ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS
John E. Sanchez*

INTRODUCTION

The absence of a unified legal theory explaining the relationships of
employers, unions and employees under a collective bargaining agreement is
apparent from the many analogies used to explain those relationships.' In
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 2 for example, the
Supreme Court referred to the collective agreement as a "generalized code" 3
which calls into being a "new common law." '4 This Article examines only
one aspect of the various relationships created by the collective agreement:
suits by an individual employee against his employer, against his union or
against both parties in a single action. The first two single defendant actions
will be treated as "non-hybrid" actions while claims in which both the union
and the employer are joined as codefendants will be denoted "hybrid" 5
actions.

*

Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law; LL.M.,

Georgetown Law Center, 1985; J.D., University of California at Berkeley, 1977; B.A., Pomona
College, 1974. The author would like to thank Professor Todd Brower and Dean Roger Abrams
for reading and commenting on a draft of this Article.
1. The courts have approached the issue of labor agreement enforcement in three separate
theoretical fashions: custom and usage, agency, and third party beneficiary. See generally C.
GREGORY & H. KATz, LABOR AND THE LAW 477-89 (3d ed. 1979) (discussing three theories of
labor agreements); Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF.
L. REV. 663, 663 n. 1(1973) (citing cases using the three theories). Occasionally contract principles
are employed to explain certain results, e.g., Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696 (1966), while, at other times, it has been possible to focus on the governmental
functions performed by the collective bargaining agreement, see Cox, Some Aspects of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947: IL The Negotiation and Administration of Collective
Agreements, 61 HARv. L. REv. 274, 275-76 (1948).
2. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
3. Id. at 578.
4. Id. at 579. "The collective agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It
calls into being a new common law-the common law of a particular industry or of a particular
plant." Id.
5. The Court has characterized such claims under the NLRA as "hybrid section 301/fair
representation claims." DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983).
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In both hybrid and non-hybrid actions, the right to a jury trial remains

unresolved. 6 This uncertainty has as much to do with the anatomy of hybrid
and non-hybrid actions as it has to do with determining the appropriate

constitutional test for the right to a jury trial. Courts currently focus both
on the legal or equitable nature of the claim and on the legal or equitable
nature of the remedies for deciding the seventh amendment right for these
actions. Beyond this articulation of the relevant factors, however, there is
7
no judicial consensus.

6. See, e.g., 2 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 1306-07 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing
right to jury trial in fair representation actions); Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation:
What the Courts Do In Fact, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 89, 108 (1985) ("Lower courts are divided
on the availability of jury trials in [hybrid] cases, but the current trend seems to favor them.").
Cases holding that the right to jury trial attaches in hybrid actions include: Cox v. C.H.
Masland & Sons, 607 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1979); Minnis v. Auto Workers, 531 F.2d 850 (8th
Cir. 1975); Rowan v. Howard Sober, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lucas v.
Philco-Ford Co., 380 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1974); McGregor v. Schlage Lock Co., 105
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 990 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
Cases denying the jury trial right in hybrid actions include: Leach v. Pan Am. World Airways,
842 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1988); Atwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491 (D. Or.
1977) (but court permits jury trial for breach of contract against employer), aff'd, 657 F.2d
1055 (9th Cir. 1981); Nedd v. Thomas, 316 F. Supp. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1970), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1013 (1978); Brady v. Trans World Airlines, 196 F. Supp. 504 (D. Del. 1961), aff'd, 401
F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969); Davidson v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 135, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2808 (S.D. Ind. 1977); Acheson v. Bottlers Local
896, 83 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2845 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 85 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2141 (S.D. Ind. 1973) (but court permits jury trial for breach of contract against
employer).
This Article only analyzes the National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act.
The right to a jury trial in hybrid actions under a third federal statute, the Civil Service Reform
Act, need not be discussed in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Karahalios v. National
Federation of Fed. Employees Local 1263, 109 S. Ct. 1282 (1989) (federal sector employee
cannot bring DFR claim in federal court). But see Brower, The Duty Of Fair Representation
Under the Civil Service Reform Act: Judicial Power to Protect Employee Rights, 40 OKLA. L.
REv. 361 (1987) (discussing duty of fair representation to federal employees).
7. Consensus, however, has not been quite so elusive in other areas. On one hand, the
jury trial guarantee has been found to exist under some federal labor statutes. For example,
under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15
(1982) (the "LMRDA"), all circuits but one, see McCraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 341
F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965), have concluded that there is a right to a jury trial on a claim for
damages under the LMRDA Bill of Rights. See Quinn v. Digiulian, 739 F.2d 637, 645-46 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (citing cases holding right to jury trial under the LMRDA); see also Comment, The
Right To Jury Trial Under The Age Discrimination In Employment and Fair Labor Standards
Acts, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 365 (1977) (suggesting functional test to resolve jury trial issue under
the ADEA and FLSA) [hereinafter Comment, The Right to Jury Trial Under ADEA and
FLSA]; Note, Fair Labor Standards Act and Trial By Jury, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 514 (1965)
(explaining conflicting decisions over right to jury under the FLSA and offering solutions for
consistency).
In contrast, courts agree that no seventh amendment right attaches to actions brought under
Title VII. See generally Comment, Jury Trial in Employment Discrimination Cases-Constitutionally Mandated?, 53 TEX. L. Rav. 483 (1975) (discussing issue of jury trial in Title VII
actions for back pay); Comment, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
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This Article will describe the nature of the debate in this area and suggest
an approach which takes into account both the complex web of federal labor
common law principles and the Supreme Court explorations of the ambit of
the seventh amendment. Part I will sketch the development of the intertwined
DFR ("Duty of Fair Representation")/breach of contract hybrid action
under the two relevant federal labor statutes. Part II will elucidate the test
for the seventh amendment right to a jury trial. Part III examines the hybrid
action, analyzes the current split among lower courts as to the proper
characterization of such suits for jury trial purposes, and concludes that the
Fifth Circuit approach, allowing a jury trial for either component of the
hybrid case, is more consistent with Supreme Court doctrine. Finally, Part
IV will analyze the right to a jury trial in non-hybrid actions against the
employer and non-hybrid DFR cases against the union.

I.

DEVELOPMENT

OF THE HYBRID ACTION

A hybrid action can arise under either the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") or the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). 9 Although there are many
similarities between hybrid actions under the NLRA and the RLA, there are
also significant differences for purposes of seventh amendment analysis.
Accordingly, this Article will analyze the hybrid action under each Act
separately, pointing out the similarities as they arise.
A.

The Hybrid Action Under the NLRA

There are two aspects to what has come to be known as a hybrid action
under both the NLRA and the RLA. The first aspect is the portion of the
suit in which an employee alleges that his employer, through the employer's
breach of the labor contract with the employee's union, has breached its
contractual obligations to him. This contract claim commonly consists of an
allegation that the employer discharged the employee without "just cause,"
as was required by the collective bargaining agreement.
The employee's right to pursue his contract claim in federal court is not
self-evident, however, even though it is federal law that guarantees employees
the substantive right to bargain collectively. 10 First, the actual signatories to
a collective bargaining agreement are the employer and the union; the
individual employees do not sign and therefore are, at best, third-party

Act of 1964, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 167 (1969) (examining legislative and constitutional precedent
and finding no right to jury trial in Title VII actions).
8. Originally passed as the Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-73 (1982)).

9. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1982).
10. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (guaranteeing right to bargain collectively in private
industries which affect interstate commerce).
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beneficiaries to the agreement." Second, federal courts do not ordinarily
have jurisdiction to hear ordinary breach of contract actions absent diversity
of citizenship. This lack of federal question jurisdiction further means that
state contract law would govern any breach of contract action on the
collective bargaining agreement, raising uniformity and choice-of-law problems as well as questions regarding the union's status as a legal entity under
12
state law.

The original version of the NLRA, passed in 1935, did not speak to these

issues. Moreover, because Congress decided not to label the breach of a
collective bargaining agreement an unfair labor practice, 3 the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB") also has no jurisdiction over these claims.

In an effort to clarify at least the jurisdictional question, the NLRA was
amended in 1947 to include section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act ("LMRA").14 Section 301 explicitly granted the federal courts subject

11. See Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Union
Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 396 (1964) (discussing
accepted view describing employees as "third party beneficiaries under the union-employer
contract.
... ). The problem with employees being a third-party beneficiary is that they are
not in privity with the employer-promisor. Although the privity requirement in contract law
has certainly been relaxed a great deal, this has been a fairly recent development and was not
the general rule in 1935 when the NLRA was passed into law. Moreover, without getting into
detail, it is also clear that even in the most generous jurisdictions, third-party beneficiaries do
not have the same rights as an actual party to the contract. See generally 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS §§ 772-818 (1951) (tracing history of the third-party beneficiary and the privity
requirement and concluding that right of the promisee and right of the beneficiary have separate
lives of their own-vicissitudes met by one do not necessarily affect the other).
12. See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW
735-36 (10th ed. 1986). The authors describe the state of the law under the early years of the
NLRA (1935-47) as follows:
Prior to the enactment of Section 301 . . . the state courts alone had jurisdiction
over suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement (except where there was
diversity of citizenship), and any substantive rights and remedies were determined
by state law. Legal rights and remedies were uncertain or ineffective or both ...
In most jurisdictions a class action was necessary for the [union] members to sue
or be sued. Execution of a money judgment would have to be levied upon the
individual property of the members. There was grave doubt whether a collective
bargaining agreement was enforceable at all and, if so, by and against whom it was
enforceable.
Id.
13. The Senate proposal to make a breach of contract an unfair labor practice was deleted
in conference: "Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of
that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National Labor
Relations Board." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42, reprinted in 1947 U.S.
CODE CONG. SERV.

1147, 1147.

14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1982). The Labor-Management Relations Act, also known as the
Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), amended and incorporated the NLRA into itself. See
generally Note, Retaliatory Discharge, Workers' Compensation and Section 301 Preemption,
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 675, 675 n.2 (1988) (brief
explanation of relationship between the NLRA and the LMRA). For purposes of clarity, this
Article will refer to those sections which were originally part of the Wagner Act of 1935 as the
NLRA and those sections which were added by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 as the LMRA.
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matter jurisdiction for breach of contract actions between an employer and
a labor organization.' 5 Moreover, although section 301 did not expressly
provide for suits by individual employees against their employers,' 6 in Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n17 the Supreme Court ruled that section 301 encompassed such suits. This holding, however, was qualified a few years later, in
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,' when the Court held that workers must
exhaust existing contractual grievance procedures before suing in court for
breach of contract.' 9 Thus, after Maddox, an employee can only exercise his
section 301 right to sue his employer for breach of labor contract if he has
exhausted all remedies accorded him under that contract. It is this exhaustion
of remedies requirement that gives rise to the second aspect of a hybrid
action.
This second aspect is the employee's claim that his union has breached its
statutory obligation to treat him fairly. This obligation on the part of unions
has no explicit statutory source, but, rather, has developed in response to
the great privileges accorded to unions under the NLRA. Section 9(a) of the

15.

Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
16. Cf. Cox, supra note 1, at 304 ("[tlhe primary purpose of section 301 is to remove [the
inability of unions to sue or be sued under state law] by treating labor organizations as entities
for the purpose of actions to recover damages for breach of contract").
17. 371 U.S. 195 (1962). Employees who were not allowed to work when another union
struck their employer alleged that the employer's conduct violated the collective bargaining
agreement, which barred discrimination against any employee on account of his union membership. Id. at 196. The individual employees sued their employer for breach of contract in
state court. The state court dismissed the case because the employer's conduct also constituted
an unfair labor practice within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that § 301 suits were not preempted merely because the underlying conduct
might also constitute an unfair labor practice. Id. at 201.
18. 379 U.S. 650 (1965). Without attempting to use the grievance procedure in the collective
bargaining agreement, Maddox sued for severance pay. Id. at 651. The Alabama courts permitted
the suit, agreeing with the plaintiff that termination of employment creates an individual right
to sue the employer for breach of contract. Id. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 659.
19. Id. at 652. Before bringing suit, the employee alleging the breach of contract must at
least attempt to use the procedure established by the collective agreement. Id.
The Maddox Court primarily relied on the "Steelworkers Trilogy" for its holding: United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). These cases established that employers bound by collective
bargaining agreements were required to use the arbitration and grievance procedures set up by
those agreements. Feller, supra note 1, at 689. The Steelworkers Trilogy put "to rest the fears
aroused in many," id. at 688, by Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
where the Court had interpreted § 301 as authorization for creation of federal substantive law.
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NLRA 2° provides that a union which is chosen by a majority of the bargaining
unit becomes the exclusive bargaining representative of that unit. Only the
union has the authority to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with
the employer. Moreover, the collective agreement will usually provide that
the union will have exclusive control over the grievance and arbitration
process. 2' Therefore, the individual employee is at the mercy of the union
as to whether his grievance will be heard. Given the Supreme Court's
requirement in Maddox that all administrative remedies be exhausted before
an employee can bring a section 301 suit against his employer, the significance
of the union's decision on whether or not to pursue those remedies in the
first instance is great indeed.
The Supreme Court responded to the lack of statutory limits on unions'
power over workers by creating the duty of fair representation. The DFR
was imposed on unions subject to the NLRA2 2 in order to prevent the union
from exercising its virtually absolute authority over the employees it represents in a discriminatory fashion. 23 Breach of the DFR may occur either in
contract negotiation 24 or in contract administration. 25 The vast majority of
DFR suits allege that the union has improperly handled an employee's

20.

Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
[rlepresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
21. See Feller, supra note 1, at 742; Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under
The Collective Bargaining Agreement. What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 251, 256 (1977).

22.

See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (scope of representation under

NLRA). See also Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944) (general discussion of bargaining

agent's duties under NLRA). The DFR was originally imposed under the Railway Labor Act
in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See infra notes 49-50 and
accompanying text for a complete discussion of Steele and its rationale. Huffman merely
extended to the NLRA the DFR principle that had been created under the RLA.
23. The duty of fair representation exists because the collective bargaining agreement
usually divests the individual of the "ability to bargain individually or to select a minority
union as [a] representative." DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 n.14 (1983). Because
of this system, the union has a duty to represent all members fairly, "without hostility or
discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and
to avoid arbitrary conduct." Id. (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)).
For further information on the duty of fair representation see Blumrosen, Duty of Fair
Representation, 15 LAB. L.J. 598 (1964); Hanslowe, The Collective Agreement and the Duty
of Fair Representation, 14 LAB. L.J. 1052 (1963); Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance
Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 81; Rosen, supra note 11; Comment, The
Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973).

24. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (negotiations related to a
proposed seniority credit for military service).
25. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (administration concerning seniority
rights), reh'g. denied, 376 U.S. 935 (1964).
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grievance. 26 Today, an aggrieved employee can proceed against a union either
before the NLRB 27 or in state or federal court28 if he can show29 that the
union's conduct was "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith."
The possibility of joining the employee's DFR claim against the union
with the section 301 breach of contract claim against the employer in one
hybrid action was first explored in Humphrey v. Moore.30 However, the
contours of the hybrid action were more fully delineated by the Court three
years later in the landmark case of Vaca v. Sipes.3' In Vaca, an employee,
Benjamin Owens, was not permitted to return to work because of his poor
health. He asked his union to take his grievance to arbitration.12 The union
decided that the grievance was not meritorious and declined to seek arbitration.33 Owens brought separate suits against the union for breach of its DFR
for wrongful discharge in violation of the collective
and against his employer
34
bargaining agreement.
The Court, in Vaca, acknowledged that the plaintiff could sue the union
and the employer either separately or together in a hybrid action.35 Moreover,
the Maddox rule, requiring exhaustion of the grievance and arbitration
process contained in the agreement, would be excused if the employee could

26. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 6, at 128 ("in approximately 80% of the published
opinions and 90% of the cases in courthouse files, the alleged breach of the union's duty
occurred in grievance handling").
27. See, e.g., NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) (finding union's breach
of its DFR to violate § 8(b)(1)(A), and § 8(b)(2) of the NLRA, thus constituting an unfair
labor practice and bringing matter within the jurisdiction of the NLRB), enforcement denied,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (although Second Circuit denied enforcement of the NLRB's
judgment, it mustered no majority on the issue of whether a union's breach of its DFR could
indeed constitute an unfair labor practice).
28. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) (finding § 301 to grant
concurrent jurisdiction to state and federal courts). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 18687 (1967) (rejecting argument that, because NLRB had held breach of DFR could also constitute
an unfair labor practice, DFR claims were therefore preempted under primary jurisdiction
doctrine from being heard in courts in the first instance).
29. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190.
30. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). A joint management and union committee decided to reduce
seniority rights of plaintiffs during the term of the agreement. Id. at 339. A Kentucky court
enjoined enforcement of the committee's decision because it lacked authority to reduce seniority
in the absence of a merger. Id. at 341. The court also ruled that the union breached its DFR.
Id. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the decision to change seniority was within
the committee's authority since there had been an absorption of this type of matter which gave
it authority to act. Id. at 347-48. The Court found that the union had not breached its DFR.
Id. at 350.
31. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
32. Id. at 175.
33. Id. at 175-76.
34. Id.at 173.
35. Id. at 184-88. The employee is also free to sue only one or the other in a single action.
Kaiser v. Local 83, 577 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1978).
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show a union's breach of the DFR.36 Therefore, proof that the union
breached its DFR was to be determined in the first instance as a jurisdictional
prerequisite to proceeding with the section 301 contract claim against the
employer. Although the Vaca Court admitted that the two component claims
of the hybrid action were distinct in nature and origin, the Court also
realized that they were interrelated for purposes of determining liability of
7
the two defendants and for apportioning damages.
B.

The Hybrid Action Under the RLA

The breach of contract aspect of the hybrid action under the RLA is in
many respects quite similar to that of the NLRA. Under the RLA, contract
disputes are classified either as major or minor. Major disputes concern the
actual formation of or change in a collective bargaining agreement.38 Minor
disputes involve the interpretation of an existing agreement 9 and, when
brought under the RLA, are comparable to a breach of contract claim under
the NLRA brought by an employee against his employer.
Yet, there are a number of procedural differences between breach of
contract actions under the NLRA and those under the RLA. First, although
the NLRA requires that contract disputes be submitted to a grievance and
arbitration process only if voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, the RLA
statutorily requires an employee to bring his contract dispute in the first
instance to the National Railroad Adjustment Board (the "Adjustment
40
Board") for resolution.
Second, most collective bargaining agreements governed by the NLRA
provide that the union has exclusive control over the grievance and arbitration
process . 4 In contrast, under the RLA, an employee has standing before the

36.

Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185.
[I]f . . . the union has sole power under the contract to invoke the higher stages
of the grievance procedure, and, if....
the employee-plaintiff has been prevented
from exhausting his contractual remedies by the union's wrongful refusal to process
the grievance . . . [this would] leave the employee remediless . . . [and] . . . be a
great injustice.
Id. at 185-86 (emphasis in original).
Nor is exhaustion required if the employer repudiates the contractual procedures for resolving
grievances. Id. at 185.
37. Id. at 183.
38. See Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 755 n.ll (3d Cir. 1978)
(major disputes involve change or formation of collective bargaining agreements).
39. See Bonin v. American Airlines, Inc., 621 F.2d 635, 637 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining
distinction between major and minor disputes), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985); Goclowski,
571 F.2d at 754 n.6 (dispute involving interpretation of collective agreement is classified as
minor).
40. See Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 322 (1972) (RLA compels
parties to arbitrate minor disputes before NLRB); Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393
U.S. 324, 328 (1969) (Railroad Adjustment Board has exclusive jurisdiction under section 3
First (i) of the RLA to interpret meaning of collective bargaining agreement).
41. Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Adjustment Board without regard for what the union concludes as to the
merits of the grievance. 42 Moreover, under the RLA, an employee may assert
against his employer a separate category of claims which has no parallel
under the NLRA. Under the RLA, when the claim against the employer is
based on a statutory violation, rather than a contractual breach, the Adjustment Board has no jurisdiction 43 and the case must therefore be brought
in court. In contrast, under the NLRA, all unfair labor practices are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.
Finally, unlike the NLRA, where court jurisdiction over breach of contract
claims is based on section 301 of the LMRA, there is no statutory equivalent
to section 301 under the RLA. Initially, in Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,"
the Supreme Court stated that an employee could sue his employer in court
45
without exhausting his administrative remedies before the Adjustment Board.
Moore, however, was later overruled in Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 46 where the Court held that the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board
over disputes arising out of a railroad's collective bargaining agreement was
exclusive.4

7

The DFR aspect of the hybrid action under the RLA is quite similar to
that of the NLRA. The RLA contains a provision analogous to section 9(a)
of the NLRA granting a union the exclusive right to represent all members

42. Thompson v. New York Cent. R.R., 361 F.2d 137, 143 n.7 (2d Cir. 1966).
43. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1957).
44. 312 U.S. 630 (1941). Under a collective agreement negotiated between the railroad and
a union, Moore was number 37 on the switchmen's seniority roster. After Moore's employer
leased its tracks to another railroad, a new seniority agreement was entered into between this
new employer and the union representing its employees. As a result, Moore's seniority position
was reduced to number 52. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Moore, 112 F.2d 959, 962 (1940).
Moore sued for breach of contract. 312 U.S. at 632. The employer argued that the suit was
premature because of Moore's failure to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the
Railway Labor Act. Id. at 634. The Supreme Court decided that Moore did not have to use
them in order to sue. Id. at 636.
45. Id. at 634-36. The Court held that nothing in the RLA took the jurisdiction to determine
a wrongful discharge action away from the courts. Id. at 634. The Court found that the use
of the word "may" as opposed to "shall" in the statute when referring to the jurisdiction of
the Adjustment Board, only provided an avenue for litigants, but did not make exhaustion
mandatory. Id. at 635.
46. 406 U.S. 320 (1972). The employee alleged that the Georgia Railroad Company refused
to permit him to return to work after his total recovery from an auto accident. Id. at 321. The
employee brought suit in state court for breach of contract based on the wrongful discharge.
Id. at 320. The railroad convinced the state court to dismiss the suit because of the employee's
failure to exhaust the remedies provided in the Railway Labor Act. Id. at 321. The Supreme
Court affirmed, thus overruling Moore. Id. at 326.
47. Id. at 325. But see also Middleton v. CSX Corp., 7 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (47 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas.) 1340 (S.D. Ga. Sep. 2, 1988), where a black railroad employee brought a
hybrid action alleging that both his union and employer colluded to deny him contractual
benefits because of his race. A federal district court in Georgia ruled that the employee need
not submit his claims to an adjustment board under the Railway Labor Act because the board
cannot provide complete relief or neutral fact-finders. Id. at 1345.
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of a craft or class. 41 In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,49 the Supreme
Court imposed a duty upon the labor organization not to discriminate against
any member of the bargaining unit in the making of a collective bargaining

agreement.5 0 The nature of the DFR claim and the standards for its breach
are essentially identical under both the NLRA and the RLA.
There is, however, one significant procedural distinction between the two
statutes with respect to the DFR. Under the NLRA, an employee can choose
to bring his DFR claim either before the NLRB or in state or federal court.5
In contrast, under the RLA, the Supreme Court has held that state or federal
5 2
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over DFR suits.
Notwithstanding these procedural distinctions, the nature of the hybrid

DFR/breach of contract claim under the RLA, as developed by the Supreme
Court in post-Vaca cases, parallels the hybrid action under the NLRA. In
Glover v. St. Louis-San FranciscoRy., 3 for example, employees sued their

union for breach of the DFR and their employer for breach of contract in
a single action. 4 Despite the employees' failure to exhaust the grievance
procedure before proceeding to court," the Supreme Court allowed the suit
which was "in essence" between the employees and their union.5 6 Indeed,

48. The RLA provides that: "Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The majority of any craft or class
of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or
class for the purposes of this [Act]." 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
49. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In Steele, an all white union negotiated an agreement which had
the effect of replacing black firemen working for the railroad with whites. Id. at 195. A black
locomotive fireman convinced the Supreme Court to enjoin enforcement of the collective
agreement. Id. at 203.
50. Id. at 204. The Court ruled that when a union becomes the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in a bargaining unit, it must represent "non-union or minority
union members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good
faith." Id. Under the RLA, a union cannot sacrifice the rights of the "minority of the craft"
for the benefit of its members. Id. at 199. Non-members are protected by the Act itself: "[tlhe
use of the word 'representative' . . . plainly implies that the representative is to act on behalf
of all the employees which, by virtue of the statute, it undertakes to represent." Id.
51. Supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
52. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1957).
53. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
54. Id. at 325. The 13 petitioners, eight black and five white men, alleged that they were
all qualified as "carmen," yet after many years of service, they continued to be classified as
"carmen helpers" and were not promoted. Id. The petitioners were unable to present their
grievances to the company and to the union despite repeated efforts. Id. at 325-27.
55. Id. at 329. The union lacked exclusive control over the grievance machinery; therefore,
the employee was free to bring his contract claim against the employer before the Adjustment
Board. Id.
56. Id. The Glover Court stressed that exhaustion was not required "where the effort to
proceed formally with contractual or administrative remedies would be wholly futile." Id. at
330. If the allegations that the union is working in concert with the employer to discriminate
is true, then exhaustion would be futile and "only serve to prolong the deprivation of rights
to which these petitioners according to their allegations are justly and legally entitled." Id. at
331.
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in Czosek v. O'Mara,'7 a case whose facts parallel those in Vaca, the Court
implicitly ruled that an employer could be joined with the union in a hybrid
claim whenever the employee's failure to exhaust the Adjustment Board
6
procedure resulted from a breach of the DFR by the union.
Thus, the differences between the NLRA and the RLA loom large for
seventh amendment purposes only when an employee brings a non-hybrid
suit against the employer for a statutory violation under the RLA. In these
suits, the legal or equitable nature of the RLA action may depend upon the
proper analogy for statutory, rather than contractual, breaches. Otherwise,
common principles govern hybrid actions under both statutes.5 9
C.

Absence of Statutory Guidance Regarding the Right to a Jury Trial in
Hybrid Actions

A hybrid action is composed of two parts: the DFR claim against the
union and the underlying contract-based claim against the employer. 60 Even
though the DFR is grounded in federal statutes, 6' it is the product of federal
common law6 2 because neither the NLRA nor the RLA explicitly mentions
the concept. Therefore, it is futile to search any statute or legislative history
for the purpose of determining a possible statutory right to a jury trial in
such cases. 6 Although the right to sue the employer for breach of contract
under the NLRA derives from section 301 of the LMRA, 64 there is no
evidence in either the statutory language or its legislative history of any
congressional intent as to the right to a jury trial. The RLA, on the other

57. 397 U.S. 25 (1970). After a merger of two railroads, the plaintiffs continued working
for the new employer until they were furloughed. Id. at 26. Treating the furlough as a final
discharge, plaintiffs sued their employer for misapplying the seniority provisions of the collective
agreement and the union for breaching its DFR for refusing to process the claims of the
plaintiffs. Id. The Second Circuit had held that unless the railroad had actively participated in
the union's breach of duty, the claim against the employer had to be dismissed and submitted
to the Adjustment Board. See id. at 28. The Supreme Court affirmed that the court had
jurisdiction over the DFR claim, but the Court was not asked to decide the proper forum for
the breach-of-contract claim. Id. at 29-30.
58. Id. at 27-28. Therefore, a DFR suit under the RLA is neither within the jurisdiction
of the Adjustment Board nor subject to the rules of exhaustion. Id. at 28.
59. For a thorough discussion of the similarities between hybrid actions under the two
acts, see Feller, supra note 1, at 676-718.
60. Under the RLA, the claim against the employer may be based on a violation of the
Act, rather than on a contract breach. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (discussing statutory origin of DER).
62. "[F]ederal common law . . . refer[s] generally to federal rules of decision where the
authority for a federal rule is not explicitly or clearly found in federal statutory or constitutional
command." P.

BATOR,

P.

MIsHKiN,

D. SHAPiRo & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE

770 (2d ed. 1973).
63. See, e.g., Leach v. Pan Am. World Airways, 842 F.2d. 285, 286 n.I (11th Cir. 1988)
(finding statute and its history of no help because action for breach of DFR was judicially
created).
64. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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hand, lacks even this specificity because it contains no jurisdictional grant
analogous to section 301.
In the absence of a statutory basis for a jury trial in hybrid and nonhybrid cases, courts must decide if the guarantee is constitutionally required
by the seventh amendment. 6 Numerous federal courts have considered the
right to a jury trial for these interrelated DFR/breach of contract suits and
they have reached conflicting results. 66 Before examining the lower court
conflict, however, it is beneficial to consider the seventh amendment legal
standard as set forth by the Supreme Court.
II.

THE

SEVENTH AMENDMENT TEST FOR THE RIGHT

To A

JURY TRIAL

Much of the existing confusion as to whether a jury trial attaches for
hybrid actions results from judicial stubbornness in continuing to apply the
equitable clean-up doctrine, a rule that predates the procedural merger of
law and equity. The doctrine is sometimes applied today despite the fact
that the Supreme Court has redefined the scope of equitable jurisdiction for
seventh amendment purposes under a merged procedure. However, in order
to understand the error in using the equitable clean-up doctrine today, it is
necessary to be familiar with the background of the seventh amendment
right to a jury trial, its peculiar doctrines and the historical development of
those doctrines. Accordingly, this section of this Article will provide such a
background, beginning with the nature of the inquiry required by the language of the amendment itself, continuing with the approach used by the
federal courts prior to 1959 and concluding with the Supreme Court's
reformulation of the inquiry beginning that same year.
A.

The Nature of the Seventh Amendment Inquiry

The seventh amendment67 "preserves" the right to a civil jury trial in the
federal courts as it existed at common law in 1791, when that amendment

65. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 166-87 and accompanying text. Even though state and federal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements, Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), there are no reported state court cases which have addressed a
seventh amendment claim for related hybrid and non-hybrid actions. Although under current
constitutional construction the right to a jury trial in civil cases is not applicable to the states,
see Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92
U.S. 90 (1875); Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd sub nom.,

Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098 (1973), it is clear that state courts must apply federal law in
resolving this issue. See Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (holding
federal common contract law created under § 301 to govern enforcement of labor contracts is
binding on state courts hearing § 301 suits); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 456-57 (1957)

(finding § 301 to authorize creation of a body of federal common law

principles to govern enforcement of labor contracts under the NLRA).
67. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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was adopted. 6 Therefore, the language of the amendment itself compels an
historical inquiry as to whether the jury right attaches to a cause of action.6 9
This historical approach requires a determination as to whether the action
would have been heard "at common law" in 1791, i.e., does the action
create rights and remedies that would have been heard by a court of law,
as opposed to a court of equity. 70 The Supreme Court, moreover, has
interpreted the "common law" referred to by the amendment as including
English common law. 71 However, the fact that a cause of action did not

exist when the amendment was ratified is not determinative of whether the
right to a jury trial attaches. Rather, this issue is determined by asking: if

the action had existed in 1791, would it have been tried in the English courts
72
of law or in Chancery?

68. Dimick v Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935) ("[in order to ascertain the scope and
meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common
law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791.").
69. For a discussion on the historical test of the right to jury under the seventh amendment,
see J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 483-87 (1985); F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 413-23 (3d ed. 1985); Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. Ray. 639, 640-49 (1973).
70.

See, e.g., Kane, Civil Jury Trial: The Case For Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28

HASTINGS

L.J. 1, 2 (1976) ("[u]nder this traditional approach, the Supreme Court has inquired whether
the particular case in question would have been tried at law or in equity in 1791 ....
).
71. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898) ("[ilt must consequently be taken that
the ... words 'trial by jury' were placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference
to the meaning affixed to them in the law as it was in this country and in England at the time
of the adoption of that instrument .

. . .").

See also Dimick, 293 U.S. at 476-77 (referring to

English precedent to determine jury trial right). See generally Kane, supra note 70, at 3-7
(discussing historical development of right to jury trial under the seventh amendment); Wolfram,
supra note 69, at 640-49 (discussing historical development of right to jury trial generally);
Comment, From Beacon Theatres to Dairy Queen to Ross: The Seventh Amendment, The
Federal Rules, and a Receding Law-Equity Dichotomy, 48 J. URB. L. 459, 460-63 (discussing

origins of right to jury trial in English common law) [hereinafter Comment, Receding LawEquity Dichotomy].
72. See Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of

Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486, 490-91 (1975). As Professor Redish explains:
In other words, modern-day courts, reasoning by analogy to the English common
law of 1791, would ask: had such a cause of action existed at that time, would the
common law have provided a right to jury trial. The answer is determined by
finding an analogue in the common law, and ascertaining how the jury trial question
was decided there.
Id. at 491 (emphasis in original).
The assertion of a seventh amendment right to jury trial under statutory causes of action
triggers essentially the same type of inquiry as that required for nonstatutory civil actions. In
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830), the Supreme Court ruled that the jury trial
right attaches not merely to suits that were tried in courts of law at the time the amendment
was ratified, but to all causes of action-including those created by statute-that involve legal
claims. Id. at 447. Suits at common law were defined by the Court as "suits in which legal
rights are to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights
alone are recognized and equitable remedies administered." Id.
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Any purely historical approach for resolving the jury trial right will
encounter several difficulties." First, in 1791, there existed separate i-luity
and common law courts, 74 but today federal courts operate under a merged

procedure in which both legal and equitable claims may be joined. 71 Second,
the merger of law and equity has increased the circumstances under which
a legal remedy may be adequate, thereby reducing the sphere of what would
have been equitable jurisdiction prior to the merger. 76 Third, many modern

rights did not exist in 1791, thus necessitating a search for common law
77

analogues to modern-day claims.
Further, even if a court today were transported back in time to the late
eighteenth century, it would not necessarily be able to determine into which
jurisdiction a particular claim would fit.7" One of the reasons for this
confusion is that there was overlap between the two separate systems and
each constantly borrowed principles from the other.79

73. See, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 69, at 487-88 ("any test
that is entirely directed to an historical inquiry inevitably fails to take account of the underlying
policies of economy and efficiency with which any intelligent allocation of jury and trial rights
must be concerned").
74. For a discussion on the development of equity and common law courts, see 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 63-119 (3d ed. 1768); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (7th ed. 1956); F. MAITLAND, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
(3d ed. 1949); W. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 12-36 (1930).
75. Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "[Tihere shall be one form
of action to be known as 'civil action."' FED. R. CIv. P. 2. Professor Moore's famous treatise
on federal practice describes the effect of rule 2 as follows:
Under the Federal Rules, the unification of law and equity was achieved by
substituting the civil action for separate units at law and in equity, so that it became
possible to present all claims and defenses, both legal and equitable, in the same
action. Indeed, the Rules compel the parties to present all facts of the matter in
controversy that involve a single claim.
5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.03, at 38-21 (2d ed. 1979).
76. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959) (in discussing right
to jury trial in an antitrust action, the Court stated that "liberal joinder" provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Declaratory Judgment Act have affected "scope of
equity").
77. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-95 (1974) (court must look to whether
or not the remedy is essentially legal or equitable in nature).
The problem with this approach is that sometimes there is no close equivalent. For example,
the declaratory judgment procedure is neither purely equitable nor purely legal. It is a 20th
century statutory procedural innovation that might be either legal or equitable or raise both
legal and equitable issues in the same action. See Comment, Right to Trial by Jury in Declaratory
Judgment Actions, 3 CONN. L. REv. 564, 566 (1971) (discussing sui generis nature of declaratory
judgment proceedings).
78. For an historical perspective on this, see 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 74, at 453;
D. KERLY, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
167 (1890); 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 35-58 (15th ed. 1988).
79. See W. WALSH, supra note 74, at 28-34, 81-95 (discussing relationship between law
and equity).
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B.

The Pre-1959 Approach to the Seventh Amendment

1. The Use of the Equitable Clean-Up Doctrine Prior to the Merger of
Law and Equity

Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties in an historical approach, prior
to the merger of law and equity 0 determining the right to a jury was aided
by the jurisdictional and procedural distinctions between courts of law and
those of equity."' If a litigant sought relief which could be classified as
"legal," he would have to go to a court of law and would be entitled to
receive a jury trial. If the claim was purely equitable, the litigant would go
before a court of equity and the judge would resolve the case since there is
2
no right to a jury for purely equitable claims.
However, when a litigant had both legal and equitable claims, he was
faced with a difficult choice. He had the option of bringing an action in
both courts or abandoning part of his claim.8 3 Because of this dilemma, as
well as a matter of economy of litigation, 4 courts developed the equitable

80. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "These rules govern the
procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable
as cases at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.
also FED. R. Crv. P. 2, supra note 75 and accompanying text.

81.

See generally J.FRIEDENTHAL, M.

KANE

& A.

MILLER,

FED

R. Crv. P. 1. See

supra note 69, at 483-85

(describing "jurisdictional line" between law and equity); McCoid, ProceduralReform and the
Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2
(1967) (right to jury was more a jurisdictional issue); Comment, Receding Law-Equity Dichotomy, supra note 71, at 463-67 (pre-merger analysis of right to jury trial).
82. 5 J. MooRE, supra note 75, at § 38.16[l].
83. Fleitmann v. Welsbach Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916), is illustrative of this dilemma. In that
case, a single shareholder brought an antitrust action and sought treble damages. The Court
found that if the action would have been brought by the corporation itself, the action would
be legal, and the legal remedy of treble damages allowable. Id. at 27-28. However, the Sherman
Act was interpreted to give private parties only a right of bringing an action for an injunction
against threatened loss, which was heard in a court of equity. Id. at 29. Although the plaintiff
was properly in a court of equity, he could not maintain his action for treble damages. Id. at
28-29.
84. E.g., Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 320, 323-24 (1951).
The fact that the equitable clean-up doctrine contributes to economy of litigation and operates
to determine the mode of trial can be illustrated by a relatively simple example. Take the
situation where an employee is discharged by his employer for stealing tools, and the union
refuses to file a grievance on his behalf. The employee sues both union and employer in a
hybrid action seeking money damages as well as judicially decreed reinstatement and backpay.
Plaintiff also demands a jury trial. If the court applies the equitable clean-up doctrine, it will
deny the request because the primary relief sought (reinstatement) is equitable and money
damages (legal relief) is treated as incidental. As this example makes clear, when the rule is
invoked, it operates to foreclose a jury trial on the legal issues which are treated as dependent
on the equitable claim. Thus, where the claims would otherwise have been brought in two
separate courts to resolve the entire matter, the doctrine would work to minimize the judicial
resources necessary to complete this task.
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clean-up doctrine. s5 This doctrine allowed a court of equity with properly
assumed jurisdiction over a case to resolve the combined, but subordinate,
8 6
legal issues along with the equitable issues.
The existence of legal issues did not create the right to a jury trial because,
in essence, the litigants were still in a court of equity. 7 Nevertheless, the
equitable clean-up doctrine served the necessary function of mitigating the

unfairness, and often the wastefulness, created by separate procedures.
Although the equitable clean-up doctrine was the result of a necessity created
by separate court systems, its use was continued for over twenty years after
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged law and equity and created a

single "civil action." 88
2. The Use of the Equitable Clean-Up Doctrine After the Merger of Law
and Equity
The merger of law and equity is considered to have removed the jurisdic-

tional and procedural distinctions between the two types of actions, while
preserving the distinctions with respect to the jury trial right. 9 As unclear
as the standards to distinguish between actions at law and those at equity
were during the pre-merger era, the loss of the jurisdictional crutch served

to further confuse matters. With the opportunity for litigants to join both
legal and equitable claims in one action, the issue of whether or not the jury

trial right attached became increasingly difficult to answer.
Many courts adopted an approach which analyzed the "basic nature" of
the claim. 90 The inquiry required that the court ask whether the claim as a
whole was basically legal or equitable in nature, i.e., would the claim have
been brought to a court of law or a court of equity? 91 If the action was

basically legal, the inquiry then proceeded on an issue by issue basis. The

85.
86.

J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 69, at 490.
1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 231-42 (S. Symons 5th ed. 1941).

87. "The general rule was often stated that equity, 'having properly acquired jurisdiction
of a cause for any purpose, it should dispose of the entire controversy and its incidents, and
not remit any part of it to a court of law."' 5 J.MOORE, supra note 75, at § 38.19[2] (quoting
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R., 244 U.S. 499, 520 (1917)). Note, however, that the
use of the equitable clean-up doctrine was purely discretionary. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE
& A. MILLER, supra note 69, at 490.
88. See J. MOORE, supra note 75, at § 38.19.
89. E.g., Fraser v. Geist, 1 F.R.D. 267, 268 (E.D. Penn. 1940). As one commentator has
noted: "[D]ecisions construing various provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure note
the underlying rationale of a merged jurisdiction: abolition of procedural differences between
law and equity actions but retention of substantive distinctions, i.e., equitable and legal rights
and remedies." Comment, Receding Law-Equity Dichotomy, supra note 71, at 467.
90. See 5 J. MOORE, supra note 75, § 38.16. For criticism of the "basic nature" test, see
F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 69, at 447-48.
91. Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir.
1961) ("the determinative test on the point at issue was the 'basic character' of the relief
sought").

1989]

HYBRID AND NON-HYBRID ACTIONS

643

right to a jury trial applied to all legal issues, which would be heard first,
92
and the judge would then determine all undecided and equitable issues.
On the other hand, if the action was basically or mainly equitable, the
judge would decide all the equitable issues in the case. The court had
discretion, however, to apply the equitable clean-up doctrine. Any legal
issues in the claim would be deemed "incidental" and subordinated to the
larger equitable claim, thus foreclosing the right to a jury trial. 93
The "basic nature of the claim" test has been applied to determine whether
the right to a jury trial attaches when an action has a mixture of legal and
equitable claims. 94 The test has also been applied when a court searches for
a common law analogue to determine whether the rights and remedies are
more like an action at law or one in equity. 9 Under either application of
the test, if a court determined that the basic nature of the claim was equitable,
the clean-up doctrine could be used to foreclose the right to a jury trial
altogether, even if legal issues were present. 96
However, as early as 1959, the Supreme Court had begun to chip away
at this approach, which was based on an exaggerated emphasis on history

92. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 69, at 485.
93. Id. at 485-86. See Levin, supra note 84, at 321; Redish, supra note 72, at 497.
A pre-merger example in the labor context of equity awarding legal relief "incidental" to
equitable jurisdiction can be found in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937), where the Supreme Court, in upholding the enforcement of a money award without
jury trial, stated that the seventh amendment preserves only: "the right which existed under
the common law when the Amendment was adopted. Thus it has no application to cases where
recovery of money damages is an incident to equitable relief even though damages might have
been recovered in an action at law." Id. at 48. For a contemporary example of this approach
in the hybrid DFR/breach-of-contract context, see Leach v. Pan Am. World Airways, 842 F.2d
285 (11th Cir. 1988).
94. See generally Simler v. Connor, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963) (although action was brought
under declaratory judgment procedure, action "was in its basic character a suit to determine
and adjudicate the amount of fees owing to a lawyer by a client under a contingent fee
contract," which is a traditionally legal action); Comment, Receding Law-Equity Dichotomy,
supra note 71, at 473 (listing cases where courts have used the "basic nature of the claim"
test).
95. This application is required when a court is presented with a new statutory cause of
action. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974) ("[The seventh amendment]
requires trial by jury in actions unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves
rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law, rather than in an
action in equity or admiralty."); Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294
F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961) ("[a]s new rights of action developed, courts characterized them as
legal or equitable by analogy to their historical counterparts to decide whether they created
rights to a jury trial.").
96. In Fraser v. Geist, 1 F.R.D. 26 (E.D. Penn. 1940), the court stated the effect of the
basic nature of the claim test as follows:
The decision as to whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial as "of
right" must rest upon a prior determination as to whether the action, in its essence,
is one at law or in equity. If it is in law, the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial;
otherwise he is not.
Id. at 267.
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and analogy. Through a series of cases, the Court adopted a dynamic concept
of the jury trial right which recognized that modern procedural developments
have expanded the universe of adequate legal remedies. 97
C.
1.

Seventh Amendment Doctrine After 1959

The Decline of the Equitable Clean-up Doctrine

The Supreme Court has turned the equitable clean-up doctrine on its head
by reversing the order of consideration: equitable issues should now be

treated as incidental to legal ones.98 This transformation began in the antitrust
case of Beacon Theatres v. Westover. 9 Although the plaintiff (the alleged
violator of the antitrust laws) sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction (essentially equitable relief), the defendant's counterclaim requested
treble damages (legal relief), on the ground that the plaintiff was violating
the Clayton and Sherman Acts. °° Under the equitable clean-up doctrine,
whether a jury heard the case would have depended on the chancellor's
discretion.' 0 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this view and eliminated
any discretion on the part of the trial court in deciding the issue.102 The
Court held that the right to a jury trial depended on the existence of an
adequate legal remedy, not on analogies to pre-merger procedure.1 0 3 There-

97.
J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 69, at 487. See also Beacon
Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959) ("the expansion of adequate legal remedies
provided by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules necessarily affects the scope
of equity").
98. This reversal, of course, only applies to federal courts. Many state courts have refused
to follow the Supreme Court's lead and instead continue to adhere to the equitable clean-up
doctrine. But it is also apparent that many federal courts have been slow to realize that the
doctrine has little remaining significance. Redish, supra note 72, at 518-20.

99.

359 U.S. 500 (1959). Respondent Fox was a movie theatre operator that made exclusive

showing contracts with movie distributors. Id. at 502. Beacon was a competitor that had

threatened to sue Fox for treble damages on the grounds that the contracts violated the Clayton
and Sherman Acts. Id. Fox, in response, filed an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act
seeking a determination of the legality of his contracts as well as an injunction restraining
Beacon from suing under the antitrust statutes. Id. at 502-03. Beacon filed a counterclaim
alleging that the contract violated the antitrust laws and requested treble damages. Id. at 503.
100. Id. at 503. Note, however, that both the complaint and counterclaim raised the same
issue: the validity of respondent Fox's "first-run" exclusive showing contracts under the antitrust
laws. Id.
101. Id. at 507. The trial judge denied Beacon's request for a jury trial based on the
equitable clean-up doctrine. The legal issues were subordinated to the equitable issues which
the judge held would be tried first. Id.
102. Id. at 508. The Court asserted that the use of discretion "to deprive Beacon of a full
jury trial .

103.

.

. cannot be justified." Id.

Id. at 507. The Court reasoned:
The basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm
and inadequacy of legal remedies. At least as much is required to justify a trial
court in using its discretion under the Federal Rules to allow claims of equitable
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fore, the Court concluded that any legal claims in the case should be tried
first,

°4

thus preserving the right to a jury trial. 05

The Supreme Court expanded the holding of Beacon Theatres in Dairy
Queen v. Wood,"'0 where the Court held that even if the legal issue is only
a fraction of the total claim, a jury trial is available on that legal cause.107

origins to be tried ahead of legal ones, since this has the same effect as an equitable
injunction of the legal claims .

. .

. Inadequacy of remedy and irreparable harm

are practical terms ....
As such their existence today must be determined, not by
precedents decided under discarded procedures, but in the light of the remedies
now made available by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules.
Id. at 506-07.
104. The Court held that a preliminary injunction may be issued by a judge before trial,
yet such would expire once the jury's findings of fact were received. Id. at 508.
105. Where both legal and equitable issues are presented in a single case, "only under the
most imperative circumstances, . . . can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through
prior determination of equitable claims." Id. at 510-11.
106. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). In Dairy Queen, the owners of a trademark sued for breach of
contract and sought injunctive relief and an accounting to determine the money owing by
petitioner. Id. at 473-75. The district court had denied a jury trial either because the action
was "purely equitable" or because the legal issues were "incidental" to the equitable issues.
Id. at 470. The Supreme Court rejected this approach as inconsistent with Beacon Theatres,
id. at 472-73, and held that a jury trial of the factual issues involving the breach of contract
and the trademark infringement claims should be granted. Id. at 479. The Court dismissed the
fact that the complaint cast the money claim in terms of an "accounting," which is usually
treated as equitable. Id. at 478-79. Reasoned the Court: "The legal remedy cannot be characterized an inadequate merely because the measure of damages may necessitate a look into the
petitioner's business records." Id. at 479. Rather, if the accounts were of such a complex
nature that "only a court of equity can unravel them," then an accounting may be deemed
equitable, and this, the Court stressed, will be a "rare case." Id. at 478. This result raises the
question as to whether, after Dairy Queen, any but the most complex claims for monetary
remedies can ever be characterized as equitable. See 5 J. MooRE, supra note 75, § 38.19[1], at
38-172.
This aspect of Dairy Queen, however, seems to have little support in lower federal court
decisions. For example, in Nedd v. Thomas, 316 F. Supp. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1970), the court denied
a jury trial in a hybrid action after characterizing the money sought not as "damages in the
legal sense" but rather, as "requesting an equitable accounting wherein damages may be
determined," and, therefore, the relief sought was equitable. See also Coca-Cola Co. v. Cahill,
330 F. Supp. 354, 355 (W.D. Okla. 1971) (characterizing relief sought in suit for an injunction
against trademark infringement and for an accounting relative to infringement as "historically
equitable in nature"), aff'd, 480 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1973); Coca-Cola Co. v. Wright, 55 F.R.D.
11 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (holding suit for injunctive relief against trademark infringement and
damages as equitable because "it is a claim primarily for injunctive relief").
107. 369 U.S. at 472-73. "Beacon Theatres requires that any legal issues for which a trial
by jury is demanded be submitted to a jury." If this is the case, the "sole" determination is
whether the action contains any legal issues. Id. at 473.
The Fifth Circuit summarized the revolution that Beacon Theatres had wrought in this way:
It is therefore immaterial that the case at bar contains a stronger basis for equitable
relief than was present in Beacon Theatres. It would make no difference if the
equitable cause clearly outweighed the legal cause so that the basic issue of the case
taken as a whole is equitable. As long as any legal cause is involved the jury rights
it creates control. This is the teaching of Beacon Theatres, as we construe it.
Thermo-Stitch, Inc., v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1961).
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The Dairy Queen Court stated that a court is not to weigh the equitable and
the legal issues and determine whether the claimant has a right to a jury
trial on the ground that one side outweighs the other. 0 Neither can the
defenses interposed by the opposing party render a legal claim equitablec 9
The third Supreme Court decision which contributed to the demise of the

equitable clean-up doctrine, Ross v. Bernhard,"0 involved a derivative action
brought by shareholders against the directors of the company."' Plaintiff
alleged breach of trust, bad faith, willful misfeasance and gross negligence,
and sought an accounting to the corporation. ' 2 Reversing the First Circuit," 3
the Supreme Court required that any legal component of an otherwise
equitable claim must be separated out for seventh amendment purposes." 4
While the right of the shareholder to sue on behalf of the corporation was
equitable in nature,"' the claim itself was legal, and if it had been brought

108. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 473. Rather, if a demand for a jury is made, such should
be granted, and "the legal claims involved in the action must be determined prior to any final
court determination of [the] equitable claims." Id. at 479.
109. As the Court made clear in Dairy Queen, "the constitutional right to trial by jury
cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings." Id. at 477-78. For
example, one defense common to both the DFR component and to the claim against the
employer in the hybrid action is the employee's failure to exhaust either contractual or internal
union remedies. This failure-to-exhaust defense is typically characterized as within the discretion
of the court. Nevertheless, Dairy Queen forbids such an admittedly equitable defense from
tainting an otherwise legal claim.
In achieving this goal, Dairy Queen implicitly overruled that portion of NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), in which the Supreme Court, in upholding the
enforcement of a money award, assessed by an administrative agency without a jury trial,
stated that the seventh amendment preserves only "the right which existed under the common
law when the amendment was adopted. Thus it has no application to cases where recovery of
money damages is an incident to equitable relief even though damages might have been recovered
in an action at law." Id. at 48.
Notwithstanding, one remaining remnant of "incidental" jurisdiction today exists in the
bankruptcy area, where an otherwise legal claim may become equitable without triggering the
seventh amendment. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966). An attempt to reconcile Dairy
Queen and Katchen can be found in Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights
Statutes: History Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 503, 516-17 (1973) [hereinafter
Comment, History Adrift].
110. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
Ill. Id.

112. Id. at 531-32.
113. Id. at 532. The district court had allowed an interlocutory appeal on the issue of the
right to jury trial in shareholders' derivative suits. Id. The Court of Appeals, in turn, held that
"a derivative action was entirely equitable in nature, and no jury was available to try any part
of it." Id.
114. Id. at 542.
115. Id. at 533-34. See generally Prunty, The Shareholder'sDerivative Suit: Notes on its
Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 980 (1957) (discussing historical development of derivative suit
and its roots in equity); Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 172-76
(1970) (discussing extension of right to jury trial to derivative suits in Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531 (1969)); Note, Jury Trial in a Stockholder's Derivative Suit, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 697
(1970) (discussing Ross); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in a Stockholders' Derivative Action,
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by the corporation itself, the right to jury trial would have existed." 6
Accordingly, the Ross Court concluded that once the trial court determines
the standing of the representatives to bring suit on behalf of the corporation,
the legal issues may be resolved by a jury." 7 The Court stressed that "[tihe

Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried
8
rather than the character of the overall action.""
The fourth and final Supreme Court ruling affecting the seventh amendment for purposes of this Article is Curtis v. Loether."9 In Curtis, the

Supreme Court ruled that the statutory origin of a cause of action cannot
be an impediment to a jury trial under the seventh amendment.

20

74 YALE L.J. 725 (1965) (discussing cases which first recognized right to jury trial in shareholders'
derivative suits).
116. Id. at 532-33. The Ross Court reasoned:
The historical rule preventing a court of law from entertaining a shareholder's suit
on behalf of the corporation is obsolete; it is no longer tenable for a district court,
administering both law and equity in the same action, to deny legal remedies to a
corporation, merely because the corporation's spokesmen are its shareholders rather
than its directors.
Id. at 540.
117. Id.
118.

Id. at 538. The Ross Court summarized Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen as standing

for the proposition that the right to a jury trial cannot be "infringed," either because the legal
claim is considered "incidental" to the equitable claim, or because the issue is "common" to
both and cannot be separated. Id.
119. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
120. In Curtis, a black woman sued a landlord under the fair housing provisions of Title
VIII (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1982)), alleging race discrimination in the landlord's
refusal to rent an apartment to her. 415 U.S. at 190. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief,
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. Although the defendant requested a jury trial, the
district court denied the request, holding that no jury trial was "authorized by Title VIII nor
required by the Seventh Amendment." Id. at 190-91.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that the seventh amendment was
not applicable to new statutory causes of action. Id. at 193. The Court, however, listed a
number of examples to the contrary, id. at 193-94, and held the amendment applicable to
statutory rights "if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for
damages in the ordinary courts of law." Id. at 194.
The Curtis Court analogized the Title VIII claim to a new statutory duty sounding in tort
that "merely defines a new legal duty." Id. at 195. The Court stressed that in cases where the
exact common law equivalent is uncertain, the jury trial right must hinge on the nature of the
remedies. Id. at 195-96. To quote the Court: "But when Congress provides for enforcement of
statutory rights in an ordinary civil action in the district courts, where there is obviously no
functional justification for denying the jury trial right, a jury trial must be available if the
action involves rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an action at law." Id. at
195. The Court distinguished the legal nature of the compensatory and punitive damages sought
from the equitable nature of backpay under Title VII. Id. at 196-97.
As will be discussed in more detail later in this Article, to the extent that courts disagree as
to the closest analogue for a breach of the DFR or for the claim against the employer, Curtis's
advice to focus on the remedy seems sound. See also infra notes 329-32 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Curtis'sremedies-based approach and the irrelevance of the statutory nature
of a cause of action for seventh amendment purposes.
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Several general premises can be gleaned from these four Supreme Court
cases as applied to DFR/breach of contract suits. First, those cases which
have rejected a jury trial in either hybrid or non-hybrid actions by treating
any legal claim as incidental to the main equitable issue are plainly incompatible with the language of Beacon Theatres. Second, the Ross approach
fatally undermines the line of cases that have rejected a jury trial in hybrid
actions because its component parts are inextricably intertwined.121 Third,

the holding in Curtis rebuts those cases 'which have denied a jury trial for
hybrid or non-hybrid actions because the right involved was unknown at
common law. Thus, the cumulative effect of these cases makes it clear that
any attempts to revive the pre-merger equitable clean-up doctrine, whether

by disguising the attempt as an inseparability argument or characterizing
legal remedies as incidental to the primary equitable one, is inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent.

2.

The Current Seventh Amendment Test and Its Relation to Hybrid

Actions

In Ross, the Supreme Court explained that a jury trial would be constitutionally mandated under the seventh amendment when the particular case
was "legal" in nature. 122 The Supreme Court, in a footnote, enunciated a
three-part test to determine this issue. 23 The nature of the claim "is deter-

mined by considering, first, the pre-merger [of law and equity] custom with
reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the
practical abilities and limitations of juries." 124 The Ross test has been criti' 25
cized as being "neither constitutionally compelled nor analytically useful.'

Nevertheless, it is clear that a court must focus both on the nature of the
claim asserted and the type of remedy sought.

There are four possible combinations of claim and remedy: 1) a legal
claim, such as breach of contract, and a legal remedy, such as damages; 2)
a legal claim and an equitable remedy' 26 such as an order to arbitrate; 3)

121.
122.

396 U.S. at 538.
Id.

123.

Id. at 538 n.10. Although the footnote was dicta, the Supreme Court applied the three

prongs of the Ross test. 415 U.S. at 195-98.

124.

396 U.S. at 538 n.10.

125. Note, The Right To Jury Trial In Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of
ERISA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 737, 746 n.73 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Enforcement Actions Under
ERISA]. See also Redish, supra note 72, at 526 ("the footnote is so cursory, conclusory and

devoid of cited authority or reasoned analysis that it is difficult to believe it could have been
intended to reject such established historical practice or Supreme Court precedent"); Note,
Ross v. Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 112 (1971)

(arguing that expansion of right to jury trial in Ross represents a departure from precedent).
126. A legal claim enforced by an equitable remedy is treated as equitable because, when
legal remedies were inadequate, Chancery had discretion to use equitable remedies to enforce
legal rights. See 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 86, § 127, p. 169, and § 139, pp. 191-92. Employment
suits under Title VII provide examples of this coupling of a legal right (because discrimination

is analogous to a dignitary tort) with equitable remedies (reinstatement and backpay).
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an equitable claim, such as seeking to vacate an order to arbitrate, and a
legal remedy; and, 4) an equitable claim and an equitable remedy, such as
reinstatement. Only in the first combination where both the claim and the
remedy are legal do courts uniformly hold that a jury trial right attaches. 127

The test to determine the right to a jury trial, enunciated in Ross, is simple
in theory but very complex in practice. Confusion arises, for example, in
determining whether the claim is legal or equitable. As the previous section

illustrates, often both legal and equitable claims are alleged, or both legal
and equitable remedies are sought. Another source of difficulty is that it is

also possible for a claim to be either legal or equitable, in which event the
nature of the remedy is the best determinant of the mode of trial.12 s Yet,
confusion can also exist as to whether a particular remedy is legal or
equitable.

Since neither the hybrid nor the non-hybrid action existed in 1791 when
the seventh amendment was adopted, courts must analogize these claims
to their closest common law equivalents under the first element of the Ross
test. The claim against the employer has been compared to breach of
contract when it arises under the NLRA,129 to an unfair labor practice, 30

127. But cf. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442 (1977) (holding that when Congress creates new public rights, it may assign their adjudication
to administrative bodies, in which jury trials would be incompatible).
128. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974); Quinn v. Digiulian, 739 F.2d 637,
646 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (nature of remedies authorized and sought has become a more reliable
clue to whether action is legal or equitable in nature than existence of a precise common law
analogy to modern cause of action). The difference in the relief granted remains the most
obvious ground for differentiating law and equity. 5 J. MooRE, supra note 75, §§ 162.9-164.
A brief, cogent discussion of the non-historical approach of deciding the jury trial question
can be found in C & K Eng'g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal. 3d 1, 14, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 330, 587 P.2d 1136, 1143 (1978) (Newman, J., dissenting):
When California courts decide whether a jury trial should be assured, I believe that
they should focus not on rights but on remedies.
In fact, most rights that are now enforced via a jury were created not by courts
but by legislatures. We look at the remedy sought, not at the judicial or legislative
history of the right, to decide whether the trial is to be "legal" or "equitable." .
. . That approach requires no complex, historical research regarding when and by
whom certain rights were created. It also requires less reliance on the anomalies of
England's unique juridical history. Courts thus may focus on a basic policy concern;
that is, the typically more continuing and more personalized involvement of the
trial judge in specific performance and injunctive decrees than in mere judgments
for damages.
Id. at 14, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 330, 587 P.2d at 1143.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Leach v. Pan Am. World Airways, 842 F.2d 285, 290 (1 1th
Cir. 1988), stated that DFR actions do not resemble any particular actions at either law or
equity. However, rather than focusing on remedies alone for determining the jury trial question,
the Leach court nevertheless treated the DFR claim as equitable because the judicial origin of
the duty seems based on general notions of justice.
129. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705 n.7 (1966).
130. DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-70 (1983).
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and to an action to vacate an arbitration award. 3 ' But it is the DFR claim
which has produced a broad variety of analogies: to breach of a fiduciary
duty;1 2 to breach of trust;' to an unfair labor practice; 34 to a personal
injury action;3 5 to a malpractice action;'1 to an action to vacate an
arbitration award;3 7 to a tort;3 8 to a new statutory cause of action;'39 and,
to breach of contract. 40 Some of these analogous claims were of equitable
origin and others were tried to a jury at common law. None of these
theories has provided much protection for the individual employee and
they have been criticized as reflecting "overly traditional or conceptualized
approaches to the unique problems in the field of labor-management

relations.'

'14'

The jury trial test is further complicated when the claims against the
employer and the union are coupled in a hybrid action. There is no

131. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63 (1981).
132. Atwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491 (D. Or. 1977).
133. See Rosen, supra note 11, at 396 n.23 (employees are the cestuis que trustent and
union is the trustee of the trust).
134. See, e.g., DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 170 ("[e]ven if not all breaches of the duty are
unfair labor practices . . . the family resemblance is undeniable"); Leach v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 842 F.2d 285, 289 (lth Cir. 1988) (need for uniformity, predictability and lack of
any state law analogy to the DFR leads us to eschew any analogy other than one to unfair
labor practice charge); Badon v. General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93, 99 (6th Cir. 1982) (since
the DFR springs from the NLRA, it is proper to look to limitations period in that statute for
unfair labor practices when deciding timeliness of § 301 hybrid actions); De Arroyo v. Sindicato
de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir.), (since union's breach
may be an unfair labor practice, statutory six-month period could be apt), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 877 (1970). Of the cases above, only Leach addressed the right to a jury trial in a hybrid
action; the rest were concerned with the proper time bar for these claims.
Under the NLRA, charges of unfair labor practices are decided by the NLRB without the
right to a jury trial. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937). Under the
RLA, analogous "unfair labor practices" are tried first to the National Railroad Adjustment
Board or a similar body. Appeals are made to a federal district court. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
135. Gallagher v. Chrysler Corp., 613 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1980); Smart v. Ellis Trucking
Co., 580 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979); Glowacki v. Motor Wheel
Corp., 67 Mich. App. 448, 241 N.W.2d 240 (1976).
136. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 175 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v.
Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 78 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 575 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (characterized hybrid action as one to vacate an arbitration award); Leach v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 842 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1988) (same).
138. Roscello v. Southwest Airlines Co., 726 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1984).
139. See, e.g., Rowan v. Howard Sober Inc., 384 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (union
members brought suit against union for breach of its DFR).
140. See De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281,
285-86 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970), where the court analyzed whether the DFR
claim might seem "contractual" in the context of a hybrid action because the principal relief
of reinstatement and backpay comes from the employer, while the union is a party only to
allow the employee to overcome the employer's "exhaustion of contract" defense. However,
under the allocation of back pay principles established in Bowen v. United States Postal Serv.,
459 U.S. 212 (1983), the union may now have substantial liability for one of the main remedies.
141. See Rosen, supra note 11, at 396.
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agreement whether to treat the hybrid as a unit for seventh amendment
purposes or to analyze the right separately for each component of the cause

of action. This only exemplifies some of the problems which arise when a
court is trying to determine the legal or equitable nature of the claim.

The second tenet of the Ross test, the nature of the remedies sought,

42

has also contributed to uncertainty in resolving a seventh amendment claim.
Congress has not specified the available remedies in hybrid actions., 43 The

universe of remedies in hybrid DFR/breach of contract actions is formidable, but the most commonly sought include back pay, reinstatement,
prospective wages where reinstatement is not possible,144 an order to arbi47

trate,1 4 an order to vacate an arbitration award,
possibly mental distress damages'

48

46

attorneys'

declaratory relief,'
fees,

49

and court

142. 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
143. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979) (noting
Congress' lack of guidance). However, regardless of whether the hybrid action is brought in
state or federal court, federal rather than state remedies apply. Atwood v. Pacific Maritime
Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491, 498 (D. Or. 1977), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1981).
144. See, e.g., Thompson v. Board of Sleeping Car Porters, 367 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1966)
(since the union's breach permitted employer to phase out employee's job, future damages were
the only effective remedy); Bowen, 470 F. Supp. at 1131 (six-year delay since discharge may
make reinstatement impractical).
145. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196 (1967) (order to arbitrate not to be awarded inflexibly
because sometimes the arbitrable issues may be resolved in the course of trying the DFR claim).
146. Leach v. Pan Am. World Airways, 842 F.2d 285 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
147. See, e.g., Acheson v. Bottlers Local 896, 83 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2845 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
(denying jury trial for a DFR action after treating the request for declaratory and injunctive
relief as equitable in nature). In Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959), and
in Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963), however, the Supreme Court ruled that the fact
that the action was in form a declaratory judgment case should not obscure the legal nature
of the action.
148. Generally, damages for mental anguish against the union for the DFR breach have
been rejected. De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); St. Clair v. Local No. 515, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir.
1969); Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 820 (D.Del. 1965). But see Richardson
v. Communications Workers of Am., 443 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1971) (awarded mental distress
damages against union for intentional discrimination; unclear whether for separate tort or for

DFR liability). See generally Duda, Damages for Mental Suffering in Discrimination Cases, 15
L. REV. 1 (1966) (providing doctrinal basis for allowing recovery for intentional
infliction of mental distress under broad array of federal statutes banning discrimination).
In Spicher v. Wilson Foods Corp, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3168 (C.D. Ill. 1985), the court
rejected a jury trial in a hybrid action even though emotional distress damages were sought,
because they were treated as incidental to the equitable remedy of reinstatement. Id. at 3169.
149. See Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 298 (1st Cir. 1978) (attorneys' fees
recoverable); Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 957, 580 F.2d.
232, 237 (6th Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981); Scott v. Local Union 377,
548 F.2d 1244, 1246 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nom., Bolden v. United States, 431
U.S. 968 (1977); Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 564 (4th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976); Holodnack v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191, 206 (D. Conn.
1974) (same). But see Cronin v. Sears, 445 F. Supp. 277, 278 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (attorneys' fees
not recoverable).
CLEv.-MAR.
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costs. 50 Punitive damages are generally unavailable under both the NLRA
and the RLA, regardless of whether the action is brought against the union
or the employer.' 5 '
There is general agreement that, with relatively few exceptions, 5 2 money

damages are available at common law only as legal relief.' 53 Remedies such
as reinstatement,'54 an order to arbitrate,'

and an order to vacate an

arbitration award'5 6 are equitable in nature. Back pay has been characterized

150. See, e.g., Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 470 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (W.D. Va.
1979) (union and employer jointly and severally responsible for court costs); Ruzicka v. General
Motors, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2822, 2837 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (union and employer jointly liable
for court costs).
151. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979) (RLA does
not contemplate the award of punitive damages against a union that violates its DFR, regardless
of the degree of intent present on the union's part); Spicher v. Wilson Foods Corp., 122
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3168, 3169 (C.D. Il. 1985) (employee alleging under the NLRA that employer
violated collective bargaining agreement not entitled to punitive damages).
152. Some areas do remain enclaves of exclusive equitable jurisdiction, such as trusts and
bankruptcy. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966):
So, in cases of bankruptcy, many incidental questions arise in the course of
administering the bankrupt estate, which would ordinarily be pure cases at law,
and in respect of their facts triable by jury, but, as belonging to the bankruptcy
proceedings, they become cases over which the bankruptcy court, which acts as a
court of equity, exercises exclusive control. Thus a claim of a debt or damages
against the bankrupt is investigated by chancery methods.
Id. at 337 (quoting Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 134 (1881)).
For a recent article arguing that Katchen did not preclude jury trials in bankruptcy courts,
see Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands of Article III and the Seventh
Amendment, 72 MiNN. L. REv. 967 (1988).

153. The Leach court cited Hartford v. Southern Pac., 273 U.S. 207, 217-18 (1927), in
support of the position that a claim for damages is not always legal. 842 F.2d at 289 n.7.
Hartford, however, has little relevance to the question of the jury trial guarantee for hybrid
actions for two reasons: 1) it is an admiralty case and "damages" in an admiralty suit are
outside the jurisdiction of the law courts and hence are not triable to a jury under the seventh
amendment; and, 2) Hartfordapplied the equitable clean-up doctrine to reach a decision that
predated both the merger of law and equity in federal courts, and the decisions in Beacon
Theatres and Dairy Queen, which undermined use of the clean-up doctrine.
The Leach court, however, was not without support for its proposition. In Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189 (1974), the Supreme Court stated that "we need not, and do not, go so far as
to say that any award of monetary relief must necessarily be 'legal' relief." Id. at 196.
Presumably, the Court had in mind the equitable characterization of back pay when it is
coupled with reinstatement in Title VII cases. For an analysis of the cases cited by the Court
in Curtis to support this position, see Comment, The Right To Jury Trial Under ADEA and

FLSA, supra note 7, at 371-72 n.47.
154. See, e.g., Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 504, 507 (D. Del. 1961)
(reinstatement held to be equitable relief), aff'd on other grounds, 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
155. See, e.g., Atwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491, 496-97 (D.Or. 1977)
(since plaintiffs abandoned their claim for damages against the union, the only relief was to
resume the grievance process and the court properly characterized this as equitable), aff'd, 657
F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1981).
156. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 619 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1979) (no right
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as equitable relief when its recovery is within the discretion of the trial
judge. 15 7 However, when the trial judge has no discretion whether to award
'
back pay, it has been termed legal relief. 58
Under the third prong of Ross, a jury trial may be denied on the ground
that the issues presented are too complex for the average layperson to
comprehend. 9 Although the Supreme Court has shown indications of dis-

to jury trial in action to vacate arbitration award under RLA), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854
(1980); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots, 373 F.2d 136 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 827 (1967).
157. Treating back pay as equitable relief has been justified on the basis that it is incidental
relief to reinstatement, e.g., Harkless v. Sweeny School Dist., 427 F.2d. 319 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); Rowan v. Howard Sober, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 1121, 1124-25,
n.2 (E.D. Mich., 1974) (action for money damages under Title VII does not create right to
jury trial because such actions are equitable); Brady v. TWA, 196 F. Supp. 504 (D. Del. 1961)
(reinstatement is equitable; back pay is incidental), or on the basis that district courts enjoy
the 'historic power of equity' to award lost wages to workers unlawfully discriminated against,
e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-25 (1975) (involving Title VII); Minnis
v. Auto Workers, 531 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir. 1975) (equity court possesses some discretionary
power to award damages in order to do complete justice) (citation omitted); Spicher v. Wilson
Foods Corp., 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3168, 3170 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (characterizing back pay as
equitable and rejecting jury trial for a hybrid action) (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975)), or that, as restitution, back pay does not warrant a jury trial, see,
e.g., FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LABOR & LABOR RELATIONS § 52 (1987) (seventh amendment establishes no right to jury trial over the issue of restitution).
However, treating a money claim for back pay as merely incidental to an equitable claim for
reinstatement has been undermined by Dairy Queen, where the Court specifically held that
"incidental jurisdiction" theories would not support denial of a jury trial. Moreover, treating
back pay as equitable because it is restitution is incorrect for two reasons. First, damages are
measured by the plaintiff's loss while restitution is measured by defendant's wrongful profit.
E.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1, at 12 (1937). Thus, back pay, being measured by
plaintiff's loss, is more accurately classified as damages. Second, even if back pay is restitution,

the generalization that restitution is equitable is also erroneous. Quasi-contract and ejectment
are but two examples of legal restitution which would warrant a jury trial.
For criticism of the discretion rationale used in Title VII cases to deem back pay an equitable
remedy, see Comment, History Adrift, supra note 109, at 523-24. Cf. Redish, supra note 72,
at 529 (fact that back pay remedy is discretionary should not determine that it is equitable in
nature).

158. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974) (plaintiff in Title VIII action entitled
to actual damages; court's order cannot be viewed as requiring defendant to disgorge funds
wrongfully held and thus, there is no basis for characterizing relief as equitable). As to hybrid
claims, there is authority that damages resulting from a breach of the DFR do not fall into a
discretionary category but may be recovered as of right. Richardson v. Communication Workers
of Am., 443 F.2d. 974 (8th Cir. 1971). See also 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 86, § 109, at 140
("[tihe distinguishing characteristics of legal remedies are their uniformity, their unchangeableness or fixedness, their lack of adaption to circumstances, and the technical rules which govern
their use."). Equitable remedies, by contrast, are highly flexible.
159. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). One reason often given for equity assuming jurisdiction
over an accounting is the difficulty of the case for a jury. See James, Right to a Jury Trial in
Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 663 (1963). The issue of whether complex trials may be kept
from juries simply because of their complexity remains unsettled. The increasing complexity of
civil cases has lead many commentators to suggest a complexity exception to the seventh
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avowing the complexity factor in deciding the jury trial question, 160 and the

Eleventh 161 and Ninth' 16 Circuits decline to recognize it, the third Ross tenet
is in wide use by lower federal courts. Some courts have discussed, in a
cursory manner, the level of difficulty presented by the issues involved in
hybrid and non-hybrid actions.163 Only one court has concluded that the

issues in a hybrid action were too complicated for a jury.'6 Indeed, factual
issues arising in DFR/breach of contract actions are no more complicated
than antitrust and shareholder derivative suits which have been found suitable
for jury determination. 65
III.

THE HYBRID ACTION'S STATUS UNDER THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT

A.

The Nature of the Hybrid Action
and the Conflict in Approaches

The hybrid action is a suit arising either under the NLRA or under the
RLA in which the plaintiff joins both the union and the employer as
defendants. 166 Although the plaintiff has the option of bringing suit against

amendment. See, e.g., Oakes, The Right to Strike the Jury Trial Demand in Complex Litigation,
34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 243 (1980) (suggesting methods by which judge could constitutionally
strike a jury in complex litigation); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation,
92 HARv. L. REV. 898 (1979) (argues that under the Ross test, inability of the jury to comprehend

evidence could render legal remedy inadequate). Moreover, the Third Circuit has found that
the fifth amendment right to due process justifies a complexity exception. In re Japanese Elec.
Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).

160. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418 n.4 (1987) (Supreme Court has not used
third factor as an independent basis for extending or foreclosing the right to jury trial under
the seventh amendment).
161. Phillips v. Kaplus, 764 F.2d. 807, 814 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059
(1986).
162. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied
sub nom., Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
163. For cases finding employment law issues not too complex for a jury to determine, see
Cox v. C. H. Masland & Sons, 607 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1979); Minnis v. Auto Workers, 531
F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975); Maas v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 224 (D. Colo. 1987).
164.
165.

Hammer v. Jones Transfer Co., 109 Lab. Cas. (CCH) para. 10,518 (N.D. Oh. 1988).
In Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Va. 1975), although court rejected

a jury trial, it permitted an advisory jury expressly because the issues involved in the action
against both the union and the employer were not too complex. Justice Black's opinion in
Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962), noted the availability of a master to assist
the jury in complex accounting cases. Whatever weight one gives to this factor, it is clear that
the typical issues addressed in either component of a hybrid case will not overtax the abilities
of a typical juror. See Rowan v. Howard Sober Inc., 384 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
(issues involved in breach of contract action against employer and breach of DFR by union,
although somewhat complex, were suitable for determination by jury).
166. Under the NLRA, § 301 provides a federal court with federal question subject matter
jurisdiction over hybrid DFR/breach of contract actions arising under the NLRA. See supra
notes 14-15 and accompanying text. But, as Justice Stewart noted in his concurring opinion in
United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981), each component has its own jurisdictional
base: while the contract claim against the employer is based on § 301, the federal question
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the union and the employer separately, 167 for purposes of this discussion,
hybrid actions include those suits against the employer in which the plaintiff
must prove breach of the union's DFR before he can proceed against the
6

employer. 1
The hybrid claim can arise in many different contexts. For example, an
employee who is disciplined or discharged by the employer will ask his union
to file a grievance. Breach of the DFR can occur either by the union's refusal
to file a grievance 69 or by the manner in which it handles the grievance and
arbitration process.' 70 However, in most instances the union has contractually7
acquired exclusive power to initiate and handle the grievance machinery.' '
Therefore, the employee cannot gain relief from the employer unless he can
prove that the reason he was unable to adjudicate his dispute by the
mechanism provided for in the collective agreement was 72that the union
undermined that process by violating its duty toward him.
The hybrid action rarely implicates a DFR breach occurring during contract
negotiation. 73 Consequently, most hybrid actions allege that the union

upon which federal jurisdiction is based in DFR actions is actually the grant of exclusivity
found in § 9(a) of the NLRA. Id. at 66 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335, 356 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (jurisdiction for DFR claim based on
federal labor statutes).
A discussion of jurisdictional concepts governing hybrid actions under the RLA can be found
in Comment, JurisdictionOver Intertwined Contract Violation and Fair Representation Claims
Under the Railway Labor Act: Richins v. Southern Pacific Co., 66 MNN. L. REV. 209 (1981).
167. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). See also De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 286-87 (1st Cir.) (employee can sue employer
under § 301 and overcome "exhaustion" defense by showing wrongful prevention by union
without ever formally joining the union in that suit), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Rivera
v. NMU Pension & Welfare & Vacation Plan, 288 F. Supp. 874, 876 (E.D. La. 1968) (employee
can sue employer and union separately for their alleged breaches of the collective bargaining
agreement); Serra v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 684, 688 (N.D. Ill. 1965)
(employee who seeks reinstatement and damages, and whose union refuses to press his grievance
can vindicate his contract rights under § 301). Cf. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1970)
(employee's action against union upheld while leave was granted to amend action against
employer). But cf. Atwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491, 495 (D. Or. 1977),
aff'd, 657 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1981). In Atwood, plaintiff sought to disjoin the union and
collect damages only against the employer. The court held that "[i]f plaintiffs had not originally
joined the union as a party defendant, the employers may well have been entitled to implead
the Union as a third party defendant. .. . Alternatively, the Employers may well have successfully
moved for joinder of the union under Rule 19." Id.
168. See, e.g., DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983). "The employee may, if
he chooses, sue one defendant and not the other; but the case he must prove is the same
I d.
whether he sues one, the other, or both ....
169. E.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967).
170. E.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976).
171. See Summers, supra note 21, at 254-56 (policy of NLRA is not to give exclusive control
over grievances to unions; most unions, however, negotiate for such exclusive control, and as
such, have special obligations to members).
172. Hines, 424 U.S. at 567; Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186.
173. A few courts, however, have held that if the employer conspired with the union in its
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breached its DFR either by failing to process the grievance, or by its manner
of conducting arbitration. A third category alleges that the union's violation
stems from discrimination against the employee for engaging in protected
activity. Although this category is often litigated as a non-hybrid DFR
75
claim, 174 these cases can also implicate the employer.
For purposes of determining the right to a jury trial, the hybrid cases can
be divided into three categories corresponding to the cluster of remedies
necessary to satisfy the plaintiff. First, there is the Vaca v. Sipes171 model
in which the DFR is breached by the union's failure to pursue a grievance
through arbitration. The employee is generally urging the court either to
order arbitration or to resolve the underlying arbitrable issue at the same
time that the DFR breach is litigated. 77 The employee will also usually ask
for damages against both defendants.
The second model is based on the Supreme Court case of Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc. 17 In contrast to Vaca, plaintiff's grievance in the Hines
model has been arbitrated and the plaintiff has lost. However, the employee
alleges that but for the DFR violation which occurred by the manner in
which the union handled the proceeding, he would have won. Therefore,
rather than arbitration, the plaintiff seeks to vacate the arbitration award.
Similarly to Vaca, though, the plaintiff also seeks damages from both
defendants.

breach of the DFR during contract negotiations, the employer may be sued along with the
union. See infra discussion in part IV(B) for further discussion of this possibility and cases so
holding.
174. See, e.g., Quinn v. Digiulian, 739 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (action against union for
challenging election procedures not treated as hybrid DFR claim).
175. See, e.g., Roscello v. Southwest Airlines Co., 726 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1984). In Roscello,
a case arising under the RLA, the employee alleged that the employer discharged him for
engaging in protected activity. Id. at 219-20. Plaintiff assisted the Teamsters in their efforts to
represent Southwest Airlines' employees. Without an election, Southwest recognized another
union and three days later plaintiff was fired, according to Southwest, for failure to perform
duties and excessive absenteeism. Id. at 219. Plaintiff sued Southwest, alleging that he was
fired for engaging in protected union organizing. Id. at 220. Plaintiff also sued the union that
won the election, alleging that it had breached its DFR by discriminating against him because
he was not a member of that union. Id.
176. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
177. The Vaca Court suggested that one reason the court itself might resolve the arbitrable
dispute rather than order arbitration is that an arbitrator may lack authority under the collective
bargaining agreement to award damages against the union for its breach. 386 U.S. at 196.
178. 424 U.S. 554 (1976). In Hines, the employer discharged employee truck drivers, claiming
that they had been dishonest in submitting inflated lodging receipts. The employees asked the
union to investigate their side of the story and the union's representative told them not to
worry and not to hire an attorney. The union took the grievance to arbitration but did not
investigate and did not present any evidence contradicting the employer's documents. The
arbitration committee upheld the discharges. Plaintiffs brought a hybrid action claiming wrongful discharge and breach of the DFR by the manner in which the union conducted the arbitration.
The Supreme Court held that a breach of the union's DFR that taints the arbitration process
removes the bar of the finality provision of the collective agreement. Id. at 567-69.
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The third model, based on Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, 179 involves a

DFR breach either by the union's failure to file a grievance or because the

union conducts the arbitration proceeding in a perfunctory manner. In
contrast to the other two models, the plaintiff in the Cox-type hybrid action
seeks only damages from the defendants. 180
As the models indicate, determining the right to a jury trial in hybrid
actions is more complicated than when the employer or the union is sued
alone in the non-hybrid context. Some courts have analyzed the right in
terms of separating the suit against the employer from the suit against the
union."s' This approach is consistent with the logic and policies of Beacon

Theatres, and the subsequent line of Supreme Court decisions consisting of
Dairy Queen, Ross and Curtis. All four of these cases suggest that the
seventh amendment requires amalgamated claims to be pulled apart, separating the legal from the equitable strands and granting a jury trial for the
8 2

legal components.'

In sharp contrast stands the Eleventh Circuit's approach, adopted in Leach
v. Pan Am. World Airways.' 3 The court in Leach treated the two components of the hybrid claim as "inextricably intertwined" for seventh amendment purposes. Under the Leach approach, the hybrid DFR/breach of
contract claim is viewed as an inseparable unit, which is then treated as
primarily an action to vacate an arbitration award. The DFR component is,

179. 607 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1979). The employee, Cox, was fired for buying high quality
carpet at scrap grade carpet prices for a fellow employee. Although the union pursued Cox's
grievance through the first three steps of the grievance procedure, it refused to proceed to
arbitration because it thought it could not win. Cox brought a hybrid action, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, and requested a jury trial. Applying the three-prong test for a
jury trial found in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), the Fifth Circuit concluded that: 1)
the DFR claim was legal in nature (after comparing it to a common tort and an action to
enforce a statutory liability); 2) the relief sought was the traditional common law remedy; and,
3) the issues involved were not too complex for jury determination. Cox, 607 F.2d at 143.
Consequently, plaintiff was held to have the right to a jury trial for both components of the
hybrid action. Id.
180. See, e.g., Minnis v. Auto Workers, 531 F.2d 850, 852-53 (8th Cir. 1975) (damages
were the only relief requested; court granted a jury trial on both DFR claim and claim against
the employer after analyzing the issues separately).
181. Some lower courts have compared the DFR claim to the equitable, rather than the
legal equivalent, such as breach of trust or fiduciary duty; e.g., Atwood v. Pacific Maritime
Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491, 496-97 (D. Or. 1977), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1055 (1981), while treating the
claim against the employer as breach of contract; e.g., Davidson v. Teamsters Local 135, 96
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2808, 2809 (S.D. Ind. 1977). Other courts have treated both claims as legal.
E.g., Rowan v. Howard Sober, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 1121, 1124-25 (E.D. Mich. 1974). Still other
courts have characterized the DFR suit as legal while characterizing the claim against the
employer as equitable. E.g., Roscello v. Southwest Airlines Co., 726 F.2d 217, 221 (5th Cir.
1984).
182. See supra notes 99-120 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of these cases
and their effect on the seventh amendment right to a jury trial, both generally and with reference
to hybrid actions.
183. 842 F.2d 285 (1lth Cir. 1988).
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therefore, subordinated to the claim against the employer and the two are
treated as a single equitable action. The Leach approach has typically gained
acceptance in those situations where an employee has already lost an arbitration hearing and has been discharged. Under this approach, a jury trial
8 4
is denied even if the plaintiff seeks damages in addition to reinstatement.
As stated above, the inseparability argument is usually made in the context
of the Hines model.' The plaintiff need not seek reinstatement, however,
to ensure the argument's success, s6 nor is it important that the employee
seek to vacate the arbitration award. In fact, the only common denominator
for use of "inseparability" seems to be that the grievant seeks to set aside
a final and binding decision reached pursuant to the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. 8 7 Further, although many hybrid DFR/breach of
contract actions are indeed patterned on the Hines model, another significant
question is the extent to which the logic of this unitary approach applies to
the other two models.
In order to explore the above issues fully, as well as to better understand
the merits of the inseparability argument, the following section will examine
the strength of the Leach approach, its logical limitations and its applicability
to hybrid actions other than those based on the Hines model. This section,
in turn, will be followed by an examination of the case law which requires
a separate analysis of the hybrid components for seventh amendment purposes. It will conclude not only that the latter approach is more consistent
with Supreme Court seventh amendment precedent, but also that the "inseparability" rationale incorrectly resurrects the defunct doctrine of equitable
clean-up by impermissibly treating legal claims as incidental to those brought
in equity.
B.

The InseparabilityArgument

The Eleventh Circuit's decision, Leach v. Pan Am. World Airways,'
contains the most thorough explication of the inseparability argument and
its importance for determining the right to a jury trial in a hybrid action.
The court relied essentially on the Supreme Court decisions of United Parcel
Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell' 9 and DelCostello v. Teamsters'9° in developing its

184. Id. at 288.
185. E.g., Leach v. Pan Am. World Airways, 842 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1988).
186. See, e.g., Hammer v. Jones Transfer Co., 109 Lab. Cas. (CCH) para. 10,518 (D.C.
Oh. 1988) (although plaintiff sought only money damages, this relief was dismissed as merely

incidental to the primary remedy: vacation of the arbitration award).
187. See Spicher v. Wilson Foods Corp., 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3168, 3170 (C.D. I11.1985).
Cf. U.M.W. v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 561 F.2d 1093, 1096 (3d Cir. 1977) ("[ilt is not arbitration
per se that federal policy favors, but rather final adjustment of differences by a means selected
by the parties.").
188. 842 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1988).
189. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
190. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
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approach. 91 These two Supreme Court cases dealt with the proper limitations
period for hybrid actions. Therefore, it is necessary to turn to a brief analysis
of these two cases.
In Mitchell, an employee brought a hybrid action in federal court seeking
reinstatement and backpay after losing in arbitration. The issue in Mitchell
was not whether there was a right to a jury trial; rather, the question
presented was the appropriate state statute of limitations period for bringing
the suit against the employer in the context of a hybrid action. 92 The district
court compared the hybrid action with an action to vacate an arbitration
award, and barred the suit based on the state's statute of limitations period
for the latter action. 93 The Second Circuit, comparing the employee's claim
against the employer to a breach of contract claim, reversed the district
court, and held that New York's six-year statute of limitations period for
contract actions was more appropriate. 94 The Supreme Court reversed and
held that the district court's position was more in line with the nature of

the federal claim and the federal policies involved. 95
The Mitchell Court reasoned that regardless of the nature of either claim
in isolation from each other, when the DFR claim and the breach of contract
claim are coupled together in a hybrid action, each loses its separate identity
through a kind of legal alchemy and coalesce to a single claim most closely
related to an action to vacate an arbitration award. 96 The Court was
disinclined to compare the suit against the employer to common law analogues, such as personal injury or malpractice actions, because those actions
"[olverlook the fact that an arbitration award stands between the employee
and any relief which may be awarded against the company." 97 As a creature
of federal labor common law, the Court in Mitchell seems to say that the
98
hybrid action is sui generis.'

191. 842 F.2d at 288-91.
192. 451 U.S. at 60.
193. Id. at 59. The district court applied the principle articulated in Auto Workers v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966), which required that "the timeliness of a section
301 suit . . . is to be determined, as a matter of federal law by reference to the appropriate
state statute of limitations." Id. at 704-05. After deciding that the limitations period of the
hybrid action would be dictated by that for vacating an arbitration award, the court simply
turned to the applicable state statute. Section 7511(a) of the New York Cival Practice Law
(McKinney 1963) provides that "[an application to vacate or modify an [arbitration] award
may be made by a party within 90 days after its delivery to him." Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 59.
The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that although a discharged employee could bring a direct
suit under state law to vacate an arbitration award, a successful § 301 claim would have the
same effect. Id. at 61 n.3.
194. 624 F.2d 394, 398 (2d Cir. 1980).
195. Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 60-61 (citing Hoosier Cardinal, 383 U.S. at 706-07).
196. As one Court of Appeals has noted: "Perhaps the most vital part of the analysis in
Mitchell was the Court's recognition that Section 301 claims are neither standard contract nor
standard tort actions." Badon v. General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1982).
197. Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 62-63, n.4.
198. DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171 (1983) (quoting Mitchell as having balanced
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The Mitchell analogy should be considered in light of the fact that the
comparatively short limitations periods for actions to vacate arbitration
awards are consistent with the federal policy of "relatively rapid disposition
of labor disputes."'99 Sensitivity to this policy consideration by the Mitchell
Court suggests that its chosen analogy was tailored to the special need for

imposing a short limitations period. 2 °°

Therefore, in light of the very different policies underlying the right to a
jury trial, 2°0 courts searching for legal or equitable analogues to the hybrid
action should pause before importing Mitchell's imprecise analogy. 20 2 Moreover, as Justice Stevens points out in his separate opinion, Mitchell did not
address the time bar's application against the union. 203 Finally, Mitchell's
value was eroded two years later when the Court rejected Mitchell's analogy
for hybrid actions by choosing the federal unfair labor practices statute of
24
limitations period in DelCostello v. Teamsters. 0

policy considerations to determine an appropriate limitations period because of imperfect
analogy between state law action and hybrid action).
199. Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 63 (citing Hoosier Cardinal, 383 U.S. at 707).
200. For a discussion of the unique policy considerations in choosing limitations periods,
see Allen v. United States, 542 F.2d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1976) ("time bars . . . serve to strike a
balance between the need for certainty and predictability in legal relationships and the role of
the courts in resolving private disputes"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977); Special Project,
Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes
of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1016-18 (1980) (analyzing "institutional," "remedial," and "promotional" justifications of limitations periods).
201. See, e.g., Quinn v. Digiulian, 739 F.2d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding DelCostello's
determination that DFR suits have no close analogy to ordinary state law actions for purposes
of locating a limitations period to offer little support for the proposition that a DFR claim is
equitable in nature for seventh amendment purposes).
202. Treating the hybrid claim as an action to vacate an arbitration award is imprecise with
regard to the DFR component. As Justice Stevens points out in his separate opinion in Mitchell,
"the arbitration proceeding did not, and indeed, could not, resolve the employee's claim against
the union." 451 U.S. at 73 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The DFR
claim cannot be resolved in an arbitration proceeding because 1) it arises out of the conduct
of that proceeding itself, id. at n.3; and, 2) "no arbitration award stands between the employee
and any relief which may be awarded against the union," id. at 75 n.7. As it turned out,
treating the hybrid action as one to vacate an arbitration award was criticized by a majority
of the Court in DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165-67 (finding that Mitchell's analogies suffered from
flaws, both of legal substance and of practical application).
Further, the Court in Mitchell complained that common law analogies are defective for use
in describing unique creatures of federal labor law. 451 U.S. 56, 62-63, n.4. Yet the limitations
period which it borrowed did not govern labor arbitration; rather, it borrowed the limitations
period in which to seek vacation of commercial arbitration awards. For a brief discussion of
the differences between labor and commercial arbitration, see DelCostello, 462 U.S. 151, 16566 n.16.
203. Mitchell only addressed the limitations period for the claim against the employer. 451
U.S. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169. The decision in Mitchell has also been criticized for
setting such a short limitations period. See, e.g., Klare, United Parcel Service v. Mitchell: Of
Docket-Clearing and Employee Rights, Mass. B.A. Lab. L. Sec. News 1 (Nov. 1981).
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In DelCostello, as in Mitchell, the issue was the proper limitations period
for the hybrid action. 2°1 Furthermore, both cases involved Hines-type hybrids.
Rejecting Mitchell's comparison of a hybrid suit to an action to vacate an
arbitration award as flawed "both in legal substance and practical application," 2°6 the Court in DelCostello analogized both components of the hybrid
action to unfair labor practice claims. 2 7 Therefore, the six-month limitations
period in section 10(b) of the NLRA was held to govern claims against both
the employer and the union. Although the Court acknowledged that the
closest state law analogy for the claim against the union was an action in
legal malpractice, 208 it found that the relatively long limitations periods for
29
such actions made it unsuitable. 0
Despite the fundamental differences between the policy considerations
underlying the adoption of a limitations period and the determination of the
right to a jury trial in hybrid actions, the Eleventh Circuit imported the
inseparability rationale of Mitchell-DelCostellointo its seventh amendment
analysis in Leach v. Pan Am. World Airways.210 Although Leach was decided
under the RLA,211 it is an example of the Hines-type hybrid action. 212 The
plaintiffs alleged that the DFR was breached by the flawed manner in which
the union had presented their grievances at arbitration. Plaintiffs sued both
the employer and the union seeking to overturn the arbitration award and
seeking damages against the union for breach of its duty. Relying on Mitchell
and DelCostello, the court treated the hybrid action as a single equitable
claim and rejected plaintiffs' claim for a jury trial 2l3 despite the fact that
214
both legal and equitable relief was sought.

205.

Although DelCostello dealt with hybrid claims under the NLRA, several lower courts

have imposed the six-month limitations period for suits arising under the RLA as well. Barnett
v. United Air Lines, 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984); Welyczko v.
U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Lindner v.
Berg, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3388 (1st Cir. 1984).
206. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166-67.
207. Id. at 170.
208. Id. at 167.
209. Id. at 168 n.18. The length of the limitation periods for malpractice actions was not

the only problem with adopting them in hybrid actions. Adopting such an analogy would also
have meant different limitations periods for the two halves of the hybrid claim. Id.at 169
n.19.
210.

211.

842 F.2d 285, 288-91 (11th Cir. 1988).

45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982). "Since the Huffman case, the union's DFR has been the

same duty whether the union involved is covered by the NLRA or the RLA." Roscello v.
Southwest Airlines Co., 726 F.2d 217, 221 (5th Cir. 1984).
212. Hines-type hybrids typically involve an action to vacate an arbitration award. The
plaintiff essentially alleges that if not for the breach of the DFR by the union during the

grievance proceeding, the plaifitiff would have won. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
213. Leach, 842 F.2d at 290.
214. Id. at 288 n.5. The Leach court cited the following cases as authority that an action
to vacate an arbitration award is equitable: Skidmore v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 619 F.2d
157 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854 (1980); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, 373 F.2d 136 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
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Indeed, in a final stroke, the Leach court also used the inseparability
approach to characterize all the relief sought as equitable and based its
determination on the ground that the primary relief (reinstatement and back
pay from the employer) was equitable. 215 However, the court completely
missed the real significance Mitchell and DelCostello may have for determining the jury trial right in DFR/breach of contract claims. The search in
those two cases for a suitable time bar in a hybrid claim is more consistent
with actions at law than with equitable claims. The latter are not governed
21 6
by rigid limitation periods, but rather, by the flexible concept of laches.
Is it true, as Justice Stewart asserted in Mitchell, that "the two claims are
inextricably interdependent" and that the "two elements of plaintiff's hybrid
action cannot be disentangled"? 27 The inseparability argument, as applied
in Leach, subordinates the DFR claim to the claim against the employer and
treats it as ancillary in a manner similar to the way in which the equitable
clean-up doctrine operated prior to the merger of law and equity. ' " As to
the remedies requested, because the action against the employer to vacate
the arbitration award is equitable, the entire hybrid action submits to that
classification for seventh amendment purposes. However, while the inseparability argument may be illuminating for the purpose of finding a limitations
period in which to bring a hybrid claim, the language of Beacon Theatres
and Dairy Queen, motivated by policies entirely different than uniformity
and swift resolution of arbitral disputes, may require-and as the next section
of this Article contends, does require-that the helix of the hybrid action
be unraveled. Perhaps even more importantly, as the preceding paragraphs
have demonstrated, the analogies invoked in Mitchell and DelCostello were
mere creatures of convenience to begin with.
Further, although the inseparability rationale may at first seem to provide
a plausible solution to some practical problems that arise in analyzing hybrid
claims, closer examination reveals weaknesses in even these potential justifications for the Leach approach. In fact, as will be shown, the strongest
statement that can be made to describe the relationship between the contract

215. Leach, 842 F.2d at 288.
216. In Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946), the Supreme Court stated:
Traditionally and for good reasons, statutes of limitation are not controlling measures of equitable relief. Such statutes have been drawn upon by equity solely for
the light they may shed in determining that which is decisive for the chancellor's
intervention, namely, whether the plaintiff has inexcusably slept on his rights so as
to make a decree against the defendant unfair ....
Id. at 396. Further, although actions at law are not governed by the equity doctrine of laches,
see J. POMEROY, supra note 86, § 425, at 190, statutes of limitation can be so drafted as to
govern both legal and equitable claims and remedies. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF REMEDrs 44 n.20 (1973).

217. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Nitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 69 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring).
See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967) (DFR "is part and parcel of [the) section 301
[claim]").
218. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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and the DFR aspects of a hybrid action is that they are, at best, interdependent.
First, analyzing the two components of the hybrid action separately for
determining the right to a jury trial may result in changing the normal order
of trial. For example, if the two claims are analyzed separately, a court may
decide that the right to a jury trial exists for the claim against the employer
but not for the claim against the union. Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen
tell us that the jury should hear the legal claims before the court determines
the equitable ones. Therefore, the breach of contract claim would be determined before the court decides if the union breached its DFR. 219 This is a
reversal of the usual order in which such actions are litigated. Indeed, in a
hybrid action, there is no need to determine whether the employer breached
220
the agreement until it is determined that the union breached its DFR.
Thus, from a standpoint of pure judicial efficiency, the Leach approach
seems to have some merit. Judicial convenience, however, is not a compelling
reason to deem the components of a hybrid action inseparable.
Second, in order for the employee to recover back pay from the union in
a hybrid action, the employee must also prove that his discharge was unjust
or wrongful. This might also seem to support the Leach approach in that it
links the two aspects of the suit together. Yet, proof that the employer
breached the agreement is not controlling as to whether there was any breach
by the union at all. 22 1 Nor does it necessarily follow that because the plaintiff
can show a DFR breach that he can also show wrongful discharge. The
arbitration award may be upheld without absolving the union for violating
its DFR, 222 but the employee will not have a chance to prove wrongful
discharge unless he can show breach of the DFR. This "intricate relationship
223
between DFR and the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements"
is more accurately described as interdependent rather than as "inseparable,"
especially in those cases where the employer is not liable because no contract
224
breach is shown, while the union remains liable for its independent breach.
Third, the plaintiff's success in proving breach of contract may have an
impact on the amount of damages allocated to the union.2 25 But this result
also tends to show interdependency rather than inseparability. Indeed, because of the apportionment of damages rules set forth by the Supreme Court

219. See Rowan v. Howard Sober, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 1121, 1123 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (citing
Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959)).
220. See Atwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491, 499 (D. Or. 1977) (it is not
necessary to determine whether the employers breached the agreement unless the trier of fact
found that the union breached its DFR), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1981).
221. Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 73-74 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

222. Id.
223. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183 (1967).
224. Kaiser v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 577 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1978).
225. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983); Mitchell, 451 U.S. at
73 n.4 (Stevens, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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in Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 2 2 6 the amount recoverable from the
union may far exceed the employer's liability. Despite this, the court in
Leach asserted that the claim against the union is only incidental to the more
important breach of contract claim against the employer.22If the two are
indeed inseparable, which is the tail and which is the dog?
Finally, assuming that the inseparability argument accurately reflects the
nature of Hines-type hybrids, does it have any validity for the other two
categories of hybrids? Some courts have held that it does apply to the Vaca

model. In Spicher v. Wilson Foods Corp.,22 a Vaca-type hybrid, the plaintiff
was foreclosed from arbitration by the union's breach of its DFR. 229 Even
though the plaintiff did not seek to vacate an arbitration award, he never-

theless sought to set aside a final decision which terminated his employinseparability
ment.23 0 The federal district court employed the Mitchell
231
argument for purposes of rejecting the right to a jury trial.
Indeed, if the Leach approach is followed to its logical conclusion, the

result in Spicher seems unavoidable. Essentially, both Hines and Vaca hybrids
seek to set aside a final decision. The court may order a de novo arbitration
for the Hines hybrid or an order to arbitrate in the first instance in the Vaca
context. Alternatively, the court may resolve the underlying arbitral dispute

in either category. An order to arbitrate is a direct form of specific per-

226. 459 U.S. 212 (1983). Charles Bowen was suspended and ultimately discharged by the
United States Postal Service after an altercation. After the union refused to take his grievance
to arbitration, Bowen brought a hybrid DFR/breach of contract action in federal court seeking
damages and injunctive relief. An advisory jury found both the Service and the union liable
and the district court instructed the jury that apportioning damages was left to its discretion.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that liability was to be apportioned based on the damages
caused by each. Id. at 222-28. The jury sat only as an advisory panel on Bowen's claims
because 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982), states that "[a]ny action against the United States under
section 1346 shall be tried by the court without a jury .... "
227. De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 286
(lst Cir.) (union's liability may well exceed the potential recovery against the employer in a
hybrid action, thereby destroying the premise that the claim against the union is only incidental
to the more important breach of contract claim against the employer), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
877 (1970).
228. 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3168 (C.D. I11.1985).
229. Id. at 3169. Plaintiff, Leonard Spicher, brought a hybrid section 301 DFR/breach of
contract action after he was discharged. He sought injunctive relief, reinstatement, back pay,
punitive damages, and damages for mental suffering and humiliation. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 3170-71. The district court rejected a jury trial for either component of the
hybrid action after applying the three-prong test found in Ross. Id. at 3169-70. Relying on the
inseparability rationale of Mitchell and DelCostello, the court analogized the hybrid action to
an unfair labor practice which it correctly characterized as essentially equitable. Id. at 3170.
The court rejected punitive damages against both defendants and treated the other legal relief
as incidental to the equitable relief. Id. at 3169. As an alternative explanation, the court
characterized the ultimate relief sought in a hybrid action as setting aside a final and binding
decision reached pursuant to the collective agreement. Id. at 3170. The court dismissed the
third prong of Ross, the relative simplicity of issues in a hybrid action, as insufficient to require
a jury trial. Id.
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formance; an order to vacate an arbitration award is an indirect attempt to
exact the same remedy. To this extent, it is arguable that the Leach approach
applies to Vaca-type hybrids as much as it does to the Hines model.
It is as yet unclear what impact the Leach approach has on the third
model, or Cox-type hybrid, where, despite being discharged,. the plaintiff
seeks only damages rather than arbitration or judicially decreed reinstatement. However, while the courts using the inseparability doctrine have not
yet addressed this issue, in effect, the plaintiff in a Cox-type hybrid action
is still requesting the court to resolve the underlying arbitrable issue. A court
has authority to do this only if the plaintiff is no longer bound by the final
decision. The core of the inseparability argument seems only to require that
the plaintiff seek relief from a final decision denying him any remedy. Under
this logic, it is unimportant that the plaintiff only seeks damages rather than
arbitration or reinstatement and the Leach approach would seem equally
applicable to this third category of hybrid actions.
C.

The Case for Separate Analysis
of the Hybrid Components

When a court must judicially determine the appropriate limitations period
for a cause of action, treating the hybrid action as a unit is a practical,
logical and simple solution consistent with the federal labor policy of promoting uniformity and swiftly resolving arbitral issues. However, inconsistent
and competing policies underlying the determination of the right to a jury
trial serve to distinguish the limitations period issue and may require that
the two components which make up the hybrid action be analyzed separately
for seventh amendment purposes.
Indeed, before Mitchell introduced the inseparability approach in 1981,
every court that addressed the issue of the right to a jury trial in hybrid
actions separated the claim against the employer from the claim against the
union for purposes of analysis. 2 2 Some courts granted a jury trial for both
claims after separate scrutiny. Other courts granted a jury trial for the claim
against the employer but not against the union, and still others did the

232. See Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, 607 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1979); Atwood v. Pacific
Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491, 496-97 (D. Or. 1977), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1981);
Rowan v. Howard Sober, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lucas v. PhilcoFord Corp., 380 F. Supp. 139, 146 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 85 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2141 (S.D. Ind. 1973).
In Vaca, although the Court did not address the jury trial question, the case contains language
firmly suggesting that the two components of the hybrid should be treated as distinct. For
example, the Court concluded that the union was not a participant in the employer's allegedly
wrongful discharge and that the employer was not a participant in the union's alleged wrongful
refusal to process the grievance. Vaca v. Sipes, 396 U.S. 171, 196 (1967). Thus, joint liability
for either wrong would have been unwarranted: "Though the union has violated a statutory
duty in failing to press the grievance, it is the employer's unrelated breach of contract which
Id.
I..."at 197 (emphasis added). See also Feller, supra note 1, at
triggered the controversy .
704 (arguing that claims against employer and union are analytically separable).
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reverse. But, despite the variety of results on this issue, no court denied a
jury trial for both claims. After Mitchell, however, courts applying the
inseparability approach must inevitably deny a jury trial in hybrid actions.
Notwithstanding the rise of the Leach approach after Mitchell, some courts
have seen through the superficial analogy that has been drawn to Mitchell
and have refused to succumb to the siren call of inseparability. The seminal
case rejecting the inseparability doctrine is the Fifth Circuit's 1984 decision
233
in Roscello v. Southwest Airlines Co.
In Roscello, an RLA case, an employee alleged that he was fired for
engaging in union organizing, and that the union discriminated against him
because he was not a union member. 2 4 As in Leach, the Court applied the
Ross criteria for determining the right to a jury trial, 2" but in contrast to
Leach, the court made a separate jury trial determination for each component
of the hybrid action. 236 Relying on its prior decision in Cox, the court
analogized the DFR claim to a common law tort, thus making it a legal
claim. 237 However, the Court refused to decide the issue of whether or not
the wrongful discharge claim against the employer was equitable. 238 Since
the DFR claim was legal, the Court held that the right to a jury trial existed
even if the claim against the employer was equitable, because under Beacon
Theatres, the "factual issues common to the legal and equitable claims must
'
be submitted to a jury." 239
After discussing the remedies, the court granted
a jury trial on the DFR claim and its overlap with the wrongful discharge
2
claim against the employer. 4
Mitchell's approach of treating the hybrid as an action to vacate an
arbitration award admittedly does not apply to RLA claims such as Roscello
since such cases involve no prior final decision which the plaintiff seeks to
avoid. Nevertheless, Roscello's approach of separating the components of
the hybrid for jury trial determination is supported by Supreme Court seventh
241
amendment precedent while the Leach approach is not.

233.

726 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1984).

234.

Id. at 219-20. Roscello does not fit under any of the three hybrid categories discussed

thus far because no grievance and arbitration process was implicated and the claim against the

employer would have been heard, if at all, by the NLRB rather than by the courts had it arisen
under the NLRA. From the employer the plaintiff sought reinstatement, back pay, and punitive
damages. Id. at 220. From both parties he sought damages for mental anguish, prospective
wages and pre-judgment interest. Id.
235. Id. at 220.
236. Id. at 221.
237. Id. at 220-21.
238. Id. at 221.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Roscello's approach of preserving a jury trial for the legal component of the hybrid
action is strikingly similar to the one taken by the Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard, 396

U.S. 531 (1970). In Ross, shareholders brought a derivative suit against the directors of their
company alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, bad faith and gross negligence. Id.
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Further, several Supreme Court decisions have noted the discrete nature
of the jurisdictional basis of the hybrid action's two components. These
comments by the Court provide additional support for the proposition that
the two parts of a hybrid action are not inseparable. For example, under
the NLRA, jurisdiction for the contract claim against the employer is based
on section 301, while jurisdiction for the DFR component is based on the
grant of exclusivity contained in section 9(a) of the NLRA. 242 Another way
of stating this distinction, as the Court in DelCostello noted, is that "[t]he
suits at issue here . . . are amalgams, based on both an express statutory
cause of action and an implied one.' '243
In summary, it appears that the Eleventh Circuit's approach of treating
the hybrid claim as a single equitable unit for seventh amendment purposes
applies to any hybrid action where the plaintiff seeks relief from some final,
antecedent decision. Although application of this doctrine of inseparability
does seem to further the aim of uniformity important to federal labor law,
the Supreme Court in Vaca evidently saw little need for uniformity in this
complex area when it concluded that the NLRB does not enjoy exclusive
jurisdiction over the DFR component of hybrid actions. 2"
Further, the Leach approach belies the spirit if not the letter of the Supreme
Court's modern seventh amendment doctrine. In fact, in its treatment of
legal claims as incidental to the equitable aspects of a hybrid action, the
inseparability doctrine resurrects the long discredited concept of equitable
clean-up. While it might be slightly more efficient to deem the components
of hybrid actions inseparable and thereby deny an employee the right to
have a jury hear any portion of his claim, a mere gain in efficiency does

at 531-32. The shareholders requested that the directors "account to the corporation for their
profits and gains and its losses." Id. at 532. Similar to the approach used in Leach, the Court
of Appeals in Ross had held that a derivative action was entirely equitable in nature and no
jury was available to try any part of it. Id. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, relying on
the dual nature of the stockholder's action. Id. at 542-43. While the plaintiff's right to sue on
behalf of the corporation was equitable, the corporation's claim was legal. Id. at 542. "The
Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the
character of the overall action." Id. at 538. This is a clear signal that courts are to separate
the legal from the equitable components of any amalgamated action.
There are other similarities between hybrid actions under federal labor laws and derivative
suits. Just as in hybrid actions where there are likely to be allegations of breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of contract, and other allegations, the plaintiffs in Ross made identical allegations
of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and gross negligence. Ross, 396 U.S. at 542.
However, this combination of legal and equitable claims did not deter the Ross Court from
severing the legal claims for determination by the jury.
242. See Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724, 727 (W.D. Va. 1975) (DFR is not
based on breach of a collective bargaining agreement; jurisdiction, therefore, cannot be based
on § 301; instead, it is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982), which confers federal jurisdiction
over suits arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce); 2 C. MoRRIs, supra note
6, at 1293 n.43 (same).
243. 462 U.S. 151, 158-59 n.12 (1982).
244. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180-83 (1967).
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not justify a denial of seventh amendment rights. Therefore, on balance, it
is the Fifth Circuit's approach in Roscello which should form the basis for

future development in this area. By its careful blending of the unique aspects
of seventh amendment theory with the important policies of federal labor
law, Roscello provides the better reasoned approach.
Having examined the seventh amendment's application in hybrid actions,
it remains only to address any change wrought in the seventh amendment
calculus when the right to a jury trial is examined in the context of nonhybrid actions.
IV.

NON-HYBRID SUITs AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT

A.

Non-Hybrid Suits Against the Employer or Union
(Not Involving DFR)

Section 301 of the LMRA has been interpreted to allow individual employees to sue either their union or employer for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement. 245 Although the RLA has no section 301 equivalent,
that statute has been interpreted to permit individual suits by employees
2 47
246
against the employer, or against both.
against the union,

Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between the two statutes in
analyzing the non-hybrid suits which may be brought against either the
employer or the union which do not involve a breach of the DFR. Under
the LMRA, section 301 provides for suits against either the employer or the
union for breach of contract. 24 By contrast, under the RLA, an employee
may sue his employer in court for violating the statute without alleging

245. In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), the Supreme Court ruled that
to exclude individual suits by employees "from the ambit of section 301 would stultify the
congressional policy of having the administration of collective bargaining contracts accomplished
under a uniform body of federal substantive law." Id. at 200. Exhaustion of contractual
remedies was not an issue in Smith because the agreement contained no grievance-arbitration
procedure. Id. at 196 n.l. Smith also confirmed the principle that judicial jurisdiction over
breach of labor agreements is not preempted by the NLRB even though the underlying dispute
involves an unfair labor practice. Id. at 197. This overlap with contract breach makes comparisons with unfair labor practices for jury trial purposes compelling.
246. In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1957), the Court held that the National
Railway Adjustment Board lacks jurisdiction over DFR claims arising under the RLA.
247. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969), held that district courts
may hear RLA hybrid suits, even though the National Railway Adjustment Board has original
jurisdiction over minor disputes between employees and the employer. Id. at 331. For a
discussion of jurisdictional problems in bringing RLA hybrid actions in court, see Feller, supra
note 1, at 707.
248. Section 301(a) of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1982)). In the hybrid action, jurisdiction for the DFR claim is considered to be based on §
301 even though the nature of the DFR claim is closer to tort than to contract. With this
exception, a suit under § 301 is essentially claiming breach of contract. See supra notes 14-15
and accompanying text.
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breach of contract. 249 Allegations of contract breach are heard by the National
20
Railway Adjustment Board, which functions much like an arbitrator.
Judicial review of Adjustment Board decisions is even more limited than

review of arbitration awards subject to the NLRA. In Andrews v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 251 the Supreme Court concluded that greater deference
must be paid to decisions rendered by the Adjustment Board procedures

25 2
under the RLA than in cases arising under section 301 of the LMRA.
Distinguishing between the two statutes is further appropriate with regard
to the jury trial question because the spectrum of remedies varies under each
statute. Although both probably bar recovery of punitive damages from the
employer, 253 compensatory damages are more readily available under the
LMRA. A majority of courts limit recovery under the RLA to reinstatement

and back pay. 254 Perhaps for this reason the right to a jury trial under the
RLA should also be more circumscribed on the ground that compensatory
damages are clearly legal in nature while reinstatement and back pay are
considered equitable. Also, neither an order to arbitrate nor one to vacate
an arbitration award is available under the RLA when the suit is based on
a statutory, rather than on a contractual, violation.
As a consequence of these differences, non-hybrid cases in this area can
best be analyzed by separating those arising under the LMRA alleging breach
of contract from those arising under the RLA which may allege a statutory
breach. The following cases will further illustrate these distinctions as they
apply to the seventh amendment right to a jury trial as well as to help
determine whether a jury is constitutionally required in these cases.

249. See Adams v. Federal Express Corp., 547 F.2d. 319, 321 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 915 (1977); Board of Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Conrad v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 494 F.2d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 1974); Dent v. Fugere, 438 F. Supp. 560 (D. Conn.
1977); Griffin v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
250. Section 3 First (i) of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1982), creates exclusive
jurisdiction for the National Railroad Adjustment Board over contractual disputes which railway
workers may have with their employers. In contrast, the Adjustment Board has no jurisdiction
over disputes between railway employees and their unions. Conley, 355 U.S. at 44-45.
251. 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
252. Id. at 323.
253. See, e.g., Spicher v. Wilson Foods Corp., 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3168, 3169 (C.D. I11.
1985) (no punitive damages against employer for wrongful discharge); Board of Ry. Carmen
of United States & Canada v. Delpro Co., 579 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Del. 1984) (as a matter of
federal labor policy, no punitive damages are available under RLA); Dian v. United Steel
Workers of Am., 486 F. Supp. 700, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (federal labor law policy against
punishment and likelihood of disruptive impact led to conclusion that punitive damages should
not be assessed under LMRA).
When the claim against the employer sounds in contract, punitive damages are awarded only
if there is a "willful abuse of a duty imposed as a result of the defendant's position of authority
or trust, as well as a breach of contract," Holodnak v. Avco-Lycoming Div., Avco Corp., 514
F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1975).
254. See Maas v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Colo. 1987) (discussing
majority position and choosing to follow it).
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Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.255 provides an example of a
section 301 action alleging the employer's breach of contract. 25 6 The Court
was called upon to choose a limitations period for the section 301 action

25 7
because neither the statute nor its legislative history provided guidance.
Although the court did not address the jury trial issue, Hoosier Cardinal is
a useful decision because it is typical of the pre-Mitchell contract analogy
approach used for characterizing the suit against the employer. The Court
borrowed the state's statute of limitations period for oral contracts because
258
that was the closest state equivalent to the suit against the employer.

Significantly, the plaintiffs did not seek reinstatement but only the money
equivalent of their accumulated vacation pay. 259 Had the court applied the

Ross criteria, the Court should have found the nature of the claim analogous
to breach of contract. Because breach of contract is a legal action when
money damages are sought, cases following this pattern should provide a

jury trial.
The fact that Mitchell more recently characterized the hybrid claim in a
way that differs from that of Hoosier Cardinal does not detract from the
validity of the above analysis. If the plaintiffs in Hoosier Cardinal had
alleged wrongful discharge in violation of the collective bargaining agreement
and sought reinstatement, rather than damages, the employer would have

255. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
256. The employer discharged employees without paying them any accumulated vacation
pay as provided for in the collective agreement. Id. at 698. The employer breached both the
written collective bargaining agreement and the individual oral employment contract by failing
to pay accumulated vacation pay when the employees were discharged. Id. Seven years after
the employees' discharge, the union sued the employer in federal court under § 301 of the
LMRA. Id. at 699.
The Court in DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983), distinguished the hybrid
action from the "straight-forward breach of contract suit" found in Hoosier Cardinal, 383
U.S. 696 (1966).
Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No. 43, 431 F. Supp. 745, 746 (E.D. Mich.
1977), provides an example of a non-hybrid § 301 action brought against a union for a breach
of contract that did not implicate the DFR. In Stamps, a jury trial was granted because of the
legal characterization of the claim (breach of contract) and the remedy sought (damages).
257. 383 U.S. at 701. Although the union, rather than the affected employees, sued the
employer, this is of small importance for seventh amendment purposes. Id. at 699-700. Since
§ 301 contains no limitations period for bringing such actions, the district court was called
upon to borrow the closest state time bar. Id. at 701. The Supreme Court accepted the district
court's application of the six-year Indiana limitations period governing oral contracts and
dismissed the suit. Id. at 707.
Because a § 301 suit involves consideration of both the collective bargaining agreement and
the hiring contract between the employee and employer, damages assessed against the employer
continue after expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Richardson v. Communication
Workers of Am., 443 F.2d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 1971). This approach to measuring damages
reinforces the contract analogy.
258. 383 U.S. at 706-07. Moreover, the Court in DelCostello acknowledged that unlike the
hybrid action, which has no close analogy, the non-hybrid claim in Hoosier Cardinal has a
close analogy in ordinary state law to a contract claim. 462 U.S. at 165.
259. 383 U.S. at 698-99.
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been able to assert the defense of failure by plaintiffs to exhaust contractual
remedies, i.e., arbitration.216 If arbitration would have taken place and the
plaintiffs had lost, then the finality of the arbitration award could only be
removed by showing a breach of the DFR by the union in its handling of
the grievance procedure. 26 Therefore, Mitchell's characterization of the claim
against the employer as one to vacate an arbitration award is only accurate
(or possible) in the context of a hybrid action. Of course the plaintiff is free
to sue only the employer for breaching the agreement, but, whether or not
the union is joined, the plaintiff must still prove the union's DFR breach in
order to gain reinstatement.
To summarize, prior to Mitchell, the suit against the employer was usually
characterized as one for breach of contract and a jury trial granted where
the employee sought a legal remedy. 62 The Supreme Court, in Mitchell,
asserted that for purposes of establishing a limitations period for suits against
the employer where the union's breach of its DFR must nonetheless be
shown, such claims were analogous to actions to vacate an arbitration
award. 263 Subsequently, DelCostello, in applying the six-month limitation
found in section 10(b) of the LMRA, suggested yet another comparison: to
an unfair labor practice. 2M These cases, however, are limited by their own
logic to hybrid actions. Thus, in cases where the DFR is not implicated,
Hoosier Cardinal continues to provide the most appropriate analogy.
In contrast, non-hybrid suits against the employer arising under the RLA
need not allege breach of contract. 26 Moreover, the statutory basis for such
suits makes comparison with the DFR claim inescapable. The case of Maas
v. Frontier Airlines, Inc. 266 is illustrative of the characterization dangers in

this area. There, the court directly addressed the jury trial right for nonhybrid actions against an employer under the RLA. The plaintiff sued his

260. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967) (discussing Maddox); Republic Steel Corp.
v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 657 (1965) (requiring exhaustion of contractual grievance remedies
before an action can be brought under § 301).
261. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc, 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976) (proof of
DFR breach removes the bar of finality from arbitral decisions).
262. Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, 607 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1979); Atwood v. Pacific
Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491 (D. Or. 1977), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1981); Rowan
v. Howard Sober Inc., 384 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Davidson v. Teamsters Local
135, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2808 (S.D. Ind. 1977); Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 85 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2141 (S.D. Ind. 1973).
263. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1981).
264. DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 170-72 (1983). The overlap between breach of
contract and unfair labor practices is particularly frequent in those suits implicating § 8(a)(5)
(good faith bargaining) and § 8(a)(3) (discrimination for engaging in protected union activity)
of the NLRA. However, since the RLA does not set forth unfair labor practices, DelCostello's
analogy has less force in describing claims against the employer arising under that Act.
265. In Texas & N.O.R. v. Board of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), the Supreme Court
held that the RLA should be construed to empower the courts to issue injunctions against
discharges of employees for their union activities and to order reinstatement.
266. 676 F. Supp. 224 (D. Colo. 1987).
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employer for wrongful termination, claiming he was fired for engaging in
protected union activity.1 67 Applying the Ross criteria, the court found no
common law counterpart to this statutory-based claim against the employer. 168 Without explanation, the court concluded that this lack of a
common law analogue suggested that such action was equitable under the
269
first tenet of Ross.
But this non sequitur is directly inconsistent with the holding and logic of
Curtis v. Loether. 270 According to Curtis, neither the statutory basis of the
claim nor its lack of a common law analogue undermines the seventh
amendment jury trial guarantee. In fact, discrimination is the nature of the
wrongdoing both in Maas and in Curtis. But the Maas court seemed to
consciously ignore this aspect of Curtis, while agreeing with the Curtis
decision that the remedies sought, the second prong of Ross, is the most
27
important tenet of the trio. 1
The plaintiff in Maas sought various forms of relief against the employer:
reinstatement, back pay, and compensatory and punitive damages.272 The
court rejected compensatory and punitive damages as inconsistent with the
statutory scheme under the RLA. 273 Reinstatement was properly classified as
equitable,274 and the demand for back pay was treated as incidental to the
primary equitable relief. 2 5 The court also analogized the wrongful discharge
claim under the RLA to a claim for reinstatement and back pay under Title
VII in support for its equitable classification of the remedies. 2 6 As to the
third prong of Ross, the court felt that a jury could handle the complexities
2
of such a case, nonetheless, it rejected the jury trial claim.
One final point to be gleaned from Maas is that the court was not able
to borrow Mitchell's analogy to an action to vacate an arbitration award

267. Id. at 225. This same allegation, if made under the LMRA, would be preempted by
the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction of unfair labor practices. Under the RLA, however, such
suits are tried first to the National Railroad Adjustment Board or a similar body. Appeals may
be made to a federal district court. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
268. 676 F. Supp. at 225-27. The Maas court stated: "The rights and duties involved in the
alleged unfair labor practice of discrimination based on union activity had no common law
counterpart triable by a jury before the merger of law and equity." Id. at 225.
269. Id. at 226.
270. 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
271. 676 F. Supp. at 226-27.
272. Id. at 226.
273. Id. at 224, 226.
274. Id. at 226. Both judicially decreed reinstatement and arbitration are remedies equitable
in nature because they are in effect specific performance. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PaCTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2309 (1971).
275. 676 F. Supp. at 226. The Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen cases, however, caution
against characterizing any legal claims for money as incidental to the equitable relief. See supra
notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
276. 676 F. Supp. at 226. Both the RLA and Title VII provide protection against employment
discrimination while Title VIII comparisons (involved in Curtis) were distinguished as involving
housing, not employment discrimination.
277.

Id. at 227.
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because, in Maas, the issue of reinstatement evidently was not arbitrable. 278
Consequently, the claim against the employer could not be treated as an
action to vacate an arbitration award. Moreover, Mitchell's rationale does
not apply in this category of non-hybrid suits against the employer involving
a statutory, rather than a contractual breach. Therefore, in RLA cases, the
Curtis approach of comparing the statutory claim to a new legal duty would
tend to support a right to a jury trial for purposes of the first Ross criterion.
To conclude, when the DFR is not implicated in the plaintiff's suit against
his employer, the nature of the claim can usually be characterized as legal
rather than equitable, whether the breach is of statutory or contractual
origin. 9 Thus, under the rule in Curtis, the constitutional right to a jury
trial should depend on the nature of the remedies sought. Applying this
principle, it is clear that reinstatement by itself is equitable, but reinstatement
and back pay is mixed legal and equitable relief. Further, Supreme Court
precedent dictates that the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on those facts
common to both claims. And in any event, no reincarnation of the equitable
clean-up doctrine in the guise of labeling legal relief as merely incidental is
appropriate.
B.

Non-Hybrid DFR Claims

Ever since the Supreme Court judicially created and articulated the DFR
from the interstices of federal labor law, it has been the focus of controversy.
Every component of the duty, including its nature, the standard for its
breach, 2 0 and exhaustion of available avenues of relief and remedies has

278. As a general rule contractual, rather than statutory disputes, are arbitrable.
279. Unless, of course, the analogy to an unfair labor practice is employed.
280. Most of the circuit courts require more than negligent conduct to show a violation of
the DFR. See, e.g., Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1983)
(following a standard of deliberate unjustifiable refusal to pursue grievance); Poole v. Budd
Co., 706 F.2d 181, 183 (6th Cir. 1983) (standard of arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith action
by union); Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 700 F.2d 457, 458 (8th Cir. 1983) (requiring a
showing that union acted "without concern or solicitude"); Condon v. Local 2944, United
Steelworkers, 683 F.2d 590, 594 (1st Cir. 1982) (standard of arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad
faith action by union); Harris v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 668 F.2d 1204, 1206-07 (lth Cir.
1982) (standard of grossly deficient conduct or reckless disregard); Findley v. Jones Motor
Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 960 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting mere negligence standard); Coe v. United
Rubber Workers, 571 F.2d 1349, 1350-51 (5th Cir. 1978) (standard of arbitrary, discriminatory
or bad faith conduct).
In contrast, some courts have accepted merely negligent conduct as evidence of breach. See,
e.g., Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1089-91 (9th Cir. 1978) (union
failed to fully inform employee of terms of settlement); Foust v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 716 (10th Cir. 1978) (union failed to pursue grievances in timely
fashion), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Schum v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 496
F.2d 328, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1974) (same); Griffin v. International Union, United Auto., A. &
A.I.W., 469 F.2d 181, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1972) (union filed grievance with manager that employee
had assaulted); De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d
281, 284-85 (1st Cir.) (union failed to investigate or pursue grievance), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
877 (1970).
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divided both the courts and legal scholars. Therefore, it should come as no
surprise that the issue of the right to a jury trial in non-hybrid DFR suits
281
is as unsettled as every other aspect of this protean doctrine.
Not every breach of the DFR by the union implicates the employer in any
wrongdoing. 28 2 This is so partly because the union owes a higher duty toward
its constituents as a result of its position as fiduciary and agent. Employees,
as third party beneficiaries under the collective bargaining agreement, are
28 3
owed a lesser duty by the employer.

Non-hybrid DFR suits can be divided into two groups based on the nature
of the breach: 1) breaches occurring during contract negotiation; and, 2)
breaches occurring during contract administration.2

84

Courts285 and legal

scholars286 have often focused on this division in setting the proper standard

281. Claims against the union for breach of its DFR can also be decided by the NLRB
provided the underlying misconduct also constitutes an unfair labor practice. Although the
Supreme Court has never decided the issue, most courts of appeal have ruled that DFR violations
can also constitute unfair labor practices. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell,
451 U.S. 56, 67-68 n.3 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring). But the Vaca Court ruled that state
and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over DFR claims even if the violation also
amounts to an unfair labor practice. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1967). There is no
right to a jury trial before the NLRB. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The
possibility of lack of uniformity between DFR decisions heard by the NLRB and those decided
by the courts was dismissed as minor by the Supreme Court in Vaca. 386 U.S. at 180-81.
Comparing the DFR action to an unfair labor practice has occasionally resulted in the denial
of the jury trial based on the argument that claims before the NLRB do not trigger the seventh
amendment.
282. Cases alleging union discrimination in the administration of hiring halls usually do not
result in the employer being named as a codefendant. See, e.g., Emmanuel v. Omaha Carpenters
Dist. Council, 535 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1976). It has been suggested that this type of non-hybrid
DFR claim should only be decided by the NLRB which can provide complete relief. See
Goldberg, supra note 6, at 121 n.129, 125 n.141.
283. See J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336 (1944) (employee as third party
beneficiary is entitled to all benefits of collective trade agreements); Rosen, supra note 11, at
396 n.20 (employees have been described as third party beneficiaries under the union-employer
contract). See also Badon v. General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93, 96 (6th Cir. 1982) (employer
owes no fiduciary or other duty to employee); Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724, 731
(W.D. Va. 1975) (same).
284. The Supreme Court extended the DFR from contract negotiation to contract administration in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). The distinction between contract negotiation
and contract administration under the NLRA is similar to the distinction, under the RLA,
between major disputes, arising out of the formation or change of collective agreements,
Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 755 n.ll (3d Cir. 1978), and minor
disputes, which concern the interpretation or application of an existing agreement, Bonin v.
American Airlines, Inc., 621 F.2d 635, 637 (5th Cir. 1980).
285. In Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723, 739-41 (1945), the Supreme Court
acknowledged the difference between negotiating and administering a collective bargaining
agreement.
286. See Gregory, A Call For Supreme Court Clarification Of the Union Duty Of Fair
Representation, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 45, 45-46 n.1 (1984); Leffler, Piercing The Duty Of Fair
Representation: The Dichotomy Between Negotiations And Grievance Handling, 1979 U. ILL.
L.F. 35.
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for proving a breach.27 However, this division is also useful in helping to
resolve the jury trial issue for several reasons. First, juries are better suited
for determining issues of fact, 28 while legal questions should be left to the
trial judge. 28 9 Claims calling into question whether an actor has violated a
legal duty are more likely to be characterized as factual and left for the jury
if the actor has a limited range of discretionary conduct. On the other hand,
where the actor is permitted a wide latitude of discretion in reaching his
decisions, determining breach is more likely to be characterized as a legal
one for the court. 290 Applying these principles to the DFR, a union has more
discretion when it is engaged in collective bargaining than in the administration of the agreement. 291 Therefore, courts considering the jury trial right
should be sensitive to this distinction.
Second, the remedies available to an aggrieved plaintiff can also differ
according to whether the breach occurred in the negotiation or in the
administration of the collective bargaining agreement. For example, if the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement are the product of discrimination
by the union against some of its constituents, a court may render the
agreement voidable and order rescission. 292 When the breach of the DFR
involves intentional racial discrimination, there is also a split of authority
as to the applicability of the prohibition against the recovery of punitive
damages. 293 The remedy of rescission, however, would not apply where the

287. It has been suggested that the DFR in contract negotiations is directly based on the
union's status as exclusive bargaining agent, while the duty is more contractually based in
contract administration. This distinction results from the provisos in § 9(a) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982); and § 3 First (j) of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First () (1982), expressly
reserving for individual employees a voice in presenting grievances to their employers. Most
collective agreements, however, provide that the union has exclusive authority to process
grievances; therefore, the DFR in contract administration is rooted in contract, rather than in
the statute. See Goldberg, supra note 6, at 99 n.39; Summers, supra note 21, at 254-56.
288. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973). Of course, factfinding is not the exclusive
province of the jury. Factfinding can be a critical matter either at law or in equity. Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 458 (1977).
289. E.g., Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 382 (1912). 2 F. POLLOCK &
F. MAITLAND, THF HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 629 (2d ed. 1968); Scott, Trial by Jury and the
Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARv. L. REv. 669, 677-78 (1918).
290. Cf. Note, Enforcement Actions Under ERISA, supra note 125, at 745 (limited review
accorded a trustee's decision argues against the right to jury trial).
291. See Goldberg, supra note 6, at 138. Although a union has greater discretion during
contract negotiation, it still has broad discretion in handling grievances. One of the policy
reasons in Foust for barring punitive damages against unions breaching the DFR was the
prospect that such damages could curtail the "broad discretion that Vaca afforded unions in
" International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 51
handling grievances ....
(1979).
292. See NLRB v. Heyman, 541 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1976).
293. Compare Foust, 442 U.S. at 59 (punitive damages not recoverable) (majority opinion);
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940) (same) and Comment, Apportionment
Of Damages In DFR/Contract Suits: Who Pays For the Union's Breach, 1981 Wisc. L. REv.
155, 163 [hereinafter Comment, Apportionment of Damages] (same) with Foust, 442 U.S. at
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breach of the DFR occurs either by failure of a union to process a grievance
or by the manner in which the arbitration proceeding is conducted. Also,
neither an order to arbitrate nor an order of reinstatement is available in
either category of non-hybrid DFR suits as long as the employer is not sued
or otherwise implicated.
A third difference between the two non-hybrid DFR categories is that
breach of the DFR in the negotiation stage does not ordinarily implicate the
employer in any wrongdoing even if he aids and abets the union in its breach
of the DFR. 2. Consequently, this form of DFR claim is rarely, if ever,
litigated as a hybrid action.295 Furthermore, when an employee alleges breach
of the DFR by the union during contract negotiation, this grievance cannot
be resolved by an interpretation of the agreement. Therefore, unlike the
DFR case arising out of contract administration in which the plaintiff must
prove that he has exhausted his contractual remedies, such exhaustion is
usually excused in the context of contract negotiation. 296 Since the issue of
exhaustion of contractual remedies is normally determined by the court as
a matter of law, 29 1 there is one less impediment to a jury trial for non-hybrid
DFR claims arising from contract negotiation.
For seventh amendment purposes, the nature of the non-hybrid DFR claim

can often be described as a form of discrimination when it occurs during
collective bargaining. The early DFR cases, such as Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R.,298 are classic examples of union discrimination against mi-

60 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (allowing punitive damages when union's conduct is outrageous)
and Quinn v. Digiulian, 739 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (punitive damages are not per se
prohibited).
294. Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724, 731-32 (W.D. Va. 1975). However, there
is some authority that if the employer acts in concert with the union in its breach of the DFR,
then the employer may be sued along with the union: O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co.,
407 F.2d. 674 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Brown
v. Northwest Pac. R.R., 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2072 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
295. This is not to say that the employer is unaffected by the remedy for the union's breach.
In the contract negotiation context of the DFR, Professor Blumrosen has noted: "Agreements
which violate the union's duty of fair representation are voidable, and management may not
rely on, them. Thus, the duty of fair representation is binding on the employer as well as on
the union." Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial
Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435, 1493 (1963).
296. Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724, 731 (W.D. Va. 1975).
297. Davidson v. Teamsters, Local 135, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2808 (S.D. Ind. 1977); Harrison
v. Chrysler Corp., 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2141 (S.D. Ind. 1973). Whether exhaustion of intraunion remedies may be excused before resorting to court has been held to lie within the
discretion of the trial judge. Cf. Semancik v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. #5, 466
F.2d. 144, 150 (1972) ("it has been well established that whether or not a plaintiff will be
required to utilize his internal union appeals is a matter within the discretion of the trial
judge").
298. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In Steele, plaintiffs sought an injunction against enforcement of
the tainted agreement, as well as a declaratory judgment as to their rights and damages against
the union. Id. at 197.
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nority members of the bargaining unit. 299 Under the Ross criteria, courts

might well analogize such DFR breaches to actions for defamation or
intentional infliction of mental distress.3 °°
The union's breach in this context has alternatively been compared to a

denial of equal protection.30' The right to a jury trial would then depend on
the legal or equitable nature of the remedies appropriate to cure such
discrimination.30 2 Under Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, there is a right
to a jury trial on all issues common to the legal remedies of damages and
the declaratory judgment. 03 Finally, although non-hybrid DFR cases alleging

some form of discrimination by the union do raise the specter of jury
prejudice against unions, 3°4 the Supreme Court has ruled that there are
adequate judicial weapons which can reduce or eliminate the danger of
tainted jury verdicts and inflated damage awards.303
DFR breaches more commonly occur during the administration of a

contract, 3°6 as for example when the union arbitrarily decides not to process

299. Enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17
(1982), has reduced the importance of the DFR as a cure for racial discrimination.
300. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 n.10 (1974). See also C. GRE(oRY & H.
KALVEN, CASES & MATERLALS ON TORTS 961 (2d ed. 1969) (poses question as to whether racial
discrimination might be treated as a dignitary tort).
301. Harper & Lupu, Fair Representation as Equal Protection, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1212
(1985).
302. When the nature of the discrimination forming the basis for the DFR violation
implicates § 8(b)(1), which prohibits unions from discriminating against employees for engaging
in protected activity, it can be argued that the closest analogy for jury trial purposes is to that
of an unfair labor practice which is treated as equitable under the seventh amendment. See
Leach v. Pan Am. World Airways, 842 F.2d 285, 290 (lth Cir. 1988) (suits to prevent unfair
labor practices are not accorded jury trial); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(right to jury trial does not apply to NLRB proceeding which was not known at common law).
303. See supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
304. Quinn v. Diguilian, 739 F.2d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Some commentators have
suggested that equity granted its jurisdiction in some cases to protect the parties from an unfair
jury trial. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1264-65 (1971).
305. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198. The Curtis Court stated that protection against the risk of
jury prejudice lies with "the trial judge's power to direct a verdict, to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or to grant a new trial ..... Id.
306. Nonetheless, breaches of the DFR do occur in contract negotiations. E.g., Coleman
v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Va. 1975). Coleman is also an example of the current
confusion with respect to the seventh amendment analysis in hybrid and non-hybrid actions.
The Coleman court, which was faced with the issue of the right to a jury trial, denied the
right, but did allow-in its discretion-the use of an advisory jury. Id. at 732. In reaching its
conclusion, however, the court not only compared the DFR claim to a tort action (clearly legal
claim), it also omitted any mention of remedies (only other factor in analysis!). Id. at 729.
Thus, the Coleman court's own reasoning makes it difficult to determine the propriety of
denying the jury trial.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct.
2641 (1988), is the latest example of a non-hybrid DFR claim arising from contract negotiation.
The court held that requiring non-union members to pay agency fees beyond those necessary
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a grievance or handles it perfunctorily. As a result, the employee sometimes
will lose his job but may decide not to seek reinstatement. In such a case,
the union alone is sued. Obviously, this means that certain remedies such as
an order to arbitrate will be foreclosed. 0 7
It is in this second category of non-hybrid DFR suits where the use of
analogies proliferate. Courts seek legal equivalents of the DFR claim either
for purposes of determining the appropriate statute of limitations for such
actions,30° or because use of the Ross criteria for determining the jury trial
right requires such an inquiry. Courts should consider, however, that common law principles may be inappropriate for describing creations of federal
labor law. 1 9
The DFR has commonly been compared to a fiduciary duty.310 To the
extent that a union is the exclusive avenue by which an aggrieved employee
may seek redress against his employer, the comparison is appropriate. The
right to a jury trial has been rejected on the basis that breach of a fiduciary
duty, like a violation of trust, historically has been treated as a creature of
equity.3"'
The DFR has also been compared, erroneously however, to a breach of
contract for purposes of applying a limitations period. 12 This comparison is
buttressed by the fact that part of plaintiff's burden in proving breach of

to finance collective bargaining activities violated the DFR. Id. at 2657. The decision did not
directly address the appropriate remedies, but presumably they would include an injunction
barring collection of fees in excess of the amount used by the union in collective bargaining.
The collective bargaining agreement provision permitting any more than this amount would be
unenforceable. Also, plaintiffs should recover any excess amounts paid in the past. All of these
remedies sound in equity and, consequently, there would seem to be no basis for finding the
right to a jury trial in such a case.
307. DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 168 n.17 (1983).
308. This was in the pre-DelCostello years, when there was no uniform limitations period.
309. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. III, 120-29 (1944).
310. See, e.g., Atwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491 (D. Or. 1977) (court
rejected the right to jury trial, and partially based its conclusion on its analogy that a union's
breach of its DFR was similar to a breach of a fiduciary duty), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.
1981). See also Richardson v. Communications Workers of Am., 443 F.2d. 974, 980 (8th Cir.
1971) ("[the union] serves in the capacity of a fiduciary to the employees"); Cox, The Legal

Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 21 (1958) ("the bargaining
representative, which is subject to fiduciary obligations, holds the employer's promises in trust
for the benefit of the individuals").
311.
G. BIsPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 112, at 120 (11th ed. 1931). See also 3 A.
SCOTT, THa LAW OF TRUSTS § 197.2, at 1630 (3d ed. 1967) (asserting that jurors are incompetent

to decide complicated questions of a trustee's conduct).
312. Butler v. Teamsters, Local 823, 514 F.2d. 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1975); Abrams v. Carrier
Corp., 434 F.2d. 1234 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971). These cases also
involved claims against the employer for allegedly violating the collective bargaining agreement.
Comparing the DFR to contract claims in these cases may only reflect a desire for a uniform
limitations period. The DFR is more a creature of labor law as it has developed under § 301
than it is of general contract law. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63 (1981).
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the DFR requires evidence that he has exhausted his contractual remedies.313

Also, the Supreme Court's formula for allocating liability for back pay
between the employer and the union suggests that the union is partially liable
for breach of contract damages.31 4 Indeed, the fact that punitive damages

are not recoverable for a union's breach of its DFR313 is more consistent
with contract law than with tort liability.31 6 But unavailability of punitive
damages is also more consistent with equity than with legal relief.3" 7 Yet it

seems clear that the union's obligation is, in the end, most similar to a tort
duty of statutory origin.3"' Where the union has conspired with the employer

313. This is so at least where the violation occurred during contract administration. Another
theory supporting the "contract" basis of the DFR claim was considered and rejected in De
Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 285-86 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970). The De Arroyo court considered whether it was the employee's
obligations as a member of the union which generated the reciprocal duty of fair representation
by the union. Id. at 286. "This duty, however, imposed and defined by federal labor policy,
is not capable of being bargained away by workers even though a written contract or union
by-laws might so provide." Id. In addition, a union's duty extends to non-union employees.
Id.
314. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983) (setting forth formula for
allocating back pay).
315. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979). The Foust Court
was concerned that allowing punitive damages against unions in DFR suits would deplete union
treasuries, curtail union discretion, and make results unpredictable. Id. at 48.
Leach v. Pan Am. World Airways, 842 F.2d 285 (lth Cir. 1988), cited Foust for the
proposition that relief in DFR cases is essentially remedial since it makes the party whole, and
it is governed by the compensation principle. Id. at 288. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that
these characteristics of remedies for violation of the union's duty were all attributes of equity.
Id. See also Comment, Apportionment of Damages, supra note 293, at 163 n.51 (Court's four
reasons for denying punitive damages are: "1) employees in DFR suits should be 'made whole'
but not more; 2) punitive awards are inhospitable to the remedial nature of federal labor policy;
3) union treasuries will be depleted; and, 4) union discretion will be curtailed") (citing Foust,
442 U.S. at 52).
316. For an example of the general rule that punitive damages are not available for breach
of contract, see .General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977). For a
discussion of the recent erosion of the ban on punitive damages for breach of contract, see
Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contracts: The Reality and Illusion of Legal Change,
61 MINN. L. REV. 207 (1977).

317. The traditional rule has been that punitive damages are incompatible with equitable
principles. See Recent Developments, Punitive Damages Held Recoverable In Action For
Equitable Relief, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 175, 176-77 (1963) (although punitive damages may be
awarded in equitable actions, it is not permitted under the weight of authority); Annotation,
Punitive Damages-A ward by Equity, 48 A.L.R.2d 947 (1956). The rule may partially reflect
a concern that judicial discretion to award punitive damages contradicts the right to a jury
trial. See Pedah Co. v. Hunt, 265 Or. 433, 509 P.2d 1197 (1973); Rexnord, Inc. v. Ferris, 294
Or. App. 392, 657 P.2d 73 (1983).
318. Foust, 442 U.S. at 59 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (DFR suit is analogous to ordinary
tort action); Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, 607 F.2d 138, 143 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); Sanderson
v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 114 (5th Cir. 1973) (same); De Arroyo v. Sindicato De
Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 877 (1970); Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Va., 1975) (same).
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to fire an employee, the union's breach seems indistinguishable from the
tort of inducing breach of contract.31 9
Every decision comparing the DFR claims either to contract or tort actions
has provided a jury trial when a legal remedy was sought. Nonetheless, ever
since DelCostello borrowed the six-month limitations period from section
10(b) of the NLRA for the hybrid action, a few courts have rejected a jury
trial after comparing the DFR claim to an unfair labor practice.3 20
While each of these analogies has merit, judges should keep in mind the
reasons for the inquiry in the first place. The policies underlying the proper
limitations period have little in common with the policies for determining
the right to a jury trial. Indeed, if the DFR claim is considered in isolation
from the hybrid action, the nearest equivalent to a breach occurring during
contract administration would be a malpractice action for faulty legal rep32
resentation. '
Quinn v. Digiulian22 presents the best analysis of the seventh amendment
issue in DFR claims based neither on contract negotiation nor administration.
In Quinn, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found a right to a jury trial
on the DFR claim.3 23 The union violated its duty by procuring plaintiff's
discharge because of his political activity within the union.3 24 Quinn asked
for damages against the union and its officers and an injunction barring the
union from interfering with his rights as a union member. Since plaintiff
sought neither arbitration nor reinstatement, the employer was not a party
to the suit. In applying the first prong of the Ross criteria, the court treated
the DFR claim as a new cause of action with no precise common law
analogue.3 25 While several federal district court decisions have rejected a jury

Cf. Richardson v. Communication Workers of Am., 443 F.2d 974, 981, 982 n.10 (8th Cir.
1971) (suggesting that when union wrongfully induces employer to discharge an employee,
employee may pursue a tortious interference with contract claim in state court separate from
DFR claim; DFR does not rest on strict principles of contract law).
319. See Sanderson, 483 F.2d at 110 n.10 (finding wrongful inducement coextensive with
unfair representation).
320. E.g., Spicher v. Wilson Foods Corp., 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3168 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
321. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 74 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("[tlhe employee's claim against his union is properly characterized
not as an action to vacate an arbitration award, but rather as a malpractice claim[;] . . . [b]y
analogy, a lawyer who negligently allows the statute of limitations to run on his client's valid
claim may be liable to his client even though the original defendant no longer has any exposure");
C. MORRIS, supra note 6, at 1292 (DFR suit is more like a malpractice suit where grievance is
mishandled in the arbitration as in Hines). Cf. DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 167
(1983) (state limitations period for legal malpractice is the closest state-law analogy for DFR
claim); id. at 172 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (appropriate time bar for the DFR claim is the
limitations period governing malpractice suits against attorneys); id. at 175 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (malpractice action against attorney provides closest analogy to an employee's DFR
claim).
322. 739 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
323. Id. at 646-47.
324. Id. at 641-42.
325. Id. at 646.
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trial on this basis,32 6 Quinn correctly relied on Curtis 27 to minimize the
importance of this lack of a common law equivalent.128 Under Curtis, the
right to a jury trial clearly hinges on the nature of the remedies.32 9 It is thus
the remedies requested and not the court's preference in drawing analogies
which should determine the right to a jury trial in non-contractual nonhybrid DFR cases.
Curtis also supports a remedies based approach to non-contract DFR suits
in its clarification of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.33 0 The Curtis
Court accomplished this by rejecting an interpretation of Jones & Laughlin
which would have denied the right to a jury trial in cases involving a
"statutory proceeding." 33 ' According to the Curtis Court, the jury trial claim
was rejected in Jones & Laughlin, not because the case derived from a
statute, but because "the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in
administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the
whole concept of administrative adjudication. 33 2 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has often found a right to a jury trial in statutory claims.333 Therefore,
it should be irrelevant that DFR suits have no close analogy to common law
actions. In such instances history offers no guide:
In determining whether there is a right to a jury trial of claims under a
modern statutory cause of action, the nature of the remedies authorized
and sought has become a more reliable clue to whether the action is legal
or equitable in nature than the existence of a precise common law analogy
to the modern cause of action.114
This brief analysis of non-hybrid DFR claims suggests the protean nature
of the union's duty. These actions, perhaps, "are not inherently legal or
equitable. They are like chameleons which take their color from surrounding
circumstances.""33 The high degree of discretion afforded the union during
contract negotiation supports the argument that breach of its DFR in this
context should be closer to a legal rather than a factual determination. Such
questions are for the judge rather than for the jury. Therefore, regardless

326. See, e.g., Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 504 (D. Del. 1961) (no
jury trial because statutory mandates of RLA do not embrace actions at common law and are
outside the seventh amendment).
327. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
328. Quinn, 739 F.2d at 646.
329. 415 U.S. 189 (1974). In Curtis, the Supreme Court held with respect to federal housing
discrimination claims that the jury trial right applied to statutory claims "if the statute creates
legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law."
Id. at 194.
330. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
331. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194 (citing Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 48).
332. Id. at 194.
333. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962) (trademark laws);
Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (immigration laws).
334. Quinn v. Digiulian, 739 F.2d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
335. James, supra note 159, at 692.
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of the remedies sought, the equitable nature of the non-hybrid action arising
from contract negotiation suggests that these claims do not warrant a jury
trial. On the other hand, breach of the DFR during contract administration
usually are fact-intensive. Also, the closest analogy for such union misconduct is to a common law malpractice action. Under this analysis, the jury
trial right hinges on the nature of the remedies sought: if any legal remedy
is requested, Supreme Court precedent requires a jury trial on all issues
common to that claim.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is a strong policy under federal labor law in favor of the private
adjustment of contract disputes. 3 6 Nevertheless, Congress consciously decided in enacting section 301 of the LMRA not to make breaches of the
collective agreement an unfair labor practice.33 7 Rather, such disputes are to
be adjudicated in state or federal courts. Similarly, the Supreme Court, in
Vaca, expressly rejected the argument that DFR claims were exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. State and federal courts share concurrent
jurisdiction over such actions. Therefore, the imperatives of federal labor
policy offer no impediment to the judicial determination of these claims
either separately or jointly in the hybrid action.
The courts should be concerned with preserving the jury trial in hybrid
suits without undue worry that doing so would violate any countervailing
values or goals of federal labor policy.338 Admittedly, the collective bargaining
agreement is not an ordinary contract to be governed by ordinary principles

336. Section 203(d) of the LMRA provides in pertinent part: "Final adjustment by a method
agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
... 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
337. See GORMAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW 456 (1976).
338. In Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), the Court held that where both
legal and equitable issues are present in a single case, "only under the most imperative
circumstances, . . . can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination
of equitable claims." Id. at 510-11. The Eleventh Circuit, in Leach v. Pan Am. World Airways,
842 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1988), commented in striking a seventh amendment claim that the
federal policies at stake in labor law constitute the "imperative circumstances" to which Beacon
Theatres referred. Id. at 289 n.7. This position is reminiscent of the "public right" rationale
which maintains that when Congress creates new statutory "public rights," it may assign their
adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without
violating the seventh amendment's injunction that jury trial is to be "preserved" in "suits at
common law." See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 430
U.S. 442 (1977); Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1965). But hybrid suits involve private
actions brought by private individuals rather than actions initiated by the government. For a
criticism of the public right doctrine, see Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases,
59 HARv. L. Rv. 720 (1946).
The "public right" reasoning would also apply when private plaintiffs rather than administrators sue under the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, under that statute, 29 U.S.C. §
16(b) (1982), private plaintiffs may recover lost pay with a jury trial.
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of contract law, and the DFR has no precise counterpart at common law.
However, rather than dissipating judicial energy in any futile search for the
true nature of the hybrid action, or of its components in non-hybrid suits,
courts should listen to the sound advice of Curtis v. Loether'3 9 and let the
jury trial hinge on the nature of the remedies sought. In so doing, courts
will avoid any application of the defunct equitable clean-up doctrine and
resolve this important issue in a manner consistent with Supreme Court
precedent.

339.

415 U.S 189 (1974).

